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III. CABLE AND TELEVISION
A. Copyright
1. Videotaping Of Copyrighted Works For Temporary Classroom
Use
After a two-year effort, the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and Administration of Justice, proudly published guidelines for
off-the-air videotaping of copyrighted works for educational use.' The
stated goal of the guidelines was to "reach an appropriate balance be-
tween the proprietary rights of copyright owners and the instructional
needs of educational institutions."2 In general, these guidelines provided
that non-profit educational institutions may, without prior permission,
videotape educational programs for classroom teaching and evaluation
purposes, but must destroy the tapes within 45 days.3
1. Guidelines for Off-Air Taping and Copyrighted Works for Educational Use, 127 CONG.
REC. E4750, E4751 (Oct. 14, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
2. Id.
3. Id. In full, the Guidelines are as follows:
1. The guidelines were developed to apply only to off-air recording by non-profit
educational institutions.
2. A broadcast program may be recorded off-air simultaneously with broadcast
transmission (including simultaneous cable retransmissions) and retained by a non-
profit educational institution for a period not to exceed the first forty-five (45) consec-
utive calendar days after date of recording. Upon conclusion of such retention pe-
riod, all off-air recordings must be erased or destroyed immediately. "Broadcast
programs" are television programs transmitted by television stations for reception by
the general public without charge.
3. Off-air recordings may be used once by individual teachers in the course of rele-
vant teaching activities, and repeated once only when instructional reinforcement is
necessary, in classrooms and similar places devoted to instruction within a single
building, cluster, or campus, as well as in the homes of students receiving formalized
home instruction, during the first ten (10) consecutive school days in the forty-five
(45) day calendar day retention period.
4. Off-air recordings may be made only at the request of and used by individual
teachers, and may not be regularly recorded in anticipation of requests. No broad-
cast program may be recorded off-air more than once at the request of the same
teacher, regardless of the number of times the program may be broadcast.
5. A limited number of copies may be reproduced from each off-air recording to
meet the legitimate needs of teachers under these guidelines. Each such additional
copy shall be subject to all provisions governing the original recording.
6. After the first ten (10) consecutive school days, off-air recordings may be used up
to the end of the firty-five (45) calendar day retention period only for teacher evalua-
tion purposes, i.e., to determine whether or not to include the broadcast program in
the teaching curriculum, and may not be used in the recording institution for student
exhibition or any other nonevaluation purpose without authorization.
7. Off-air recordings need not be used in their entirety, but the recorded programs
may not be altered from their original content. Off-air recordings may not be physi-
cally or electronically combined or merged to constitute teaching anthologies or
compilation.
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Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks4 is the first,
and so far the only, decision interpreting the application of the guidelines
to a non-profit organization's off-air copying of educational programs for
the use by and at the request of non-profit educational institutions. The
court held that where the owners of the copyrighted educational materi-
als make their works readily available to educational institutions, a non-
profit organization's videotaping, duplicating, and distribution of these
works at the request of teachers does not constitute "fair use" even if the
tapes are to be used only for temporary teaching and evaluation
purposes.
Plaintiffs were profit-oriented corporations primarily engaged in the
production and distribution of educational programs designed for the ed-
ucational and related markets.5 The Board of Cooperative Educational
Services ("BOCES") was a non-profit organization with extensive facili-
ties for off-the-air videotaping and duplication of programs, as well as a
videotape library.6 BOCES' stated purpose was to provide a variety of
educational services in a more economical manner than was possible by
an individual school or school district.7 In the 1982 decision, the court
granted a permanent injunction against BOCES' systematic videotaping,
duplicating, and distribution of plaintiffs' copyrighted materials,8 but left
open the possibility that temporary or limited use of plaintiffs' works
might be legal under the new Copyright Act.9 Encouraged by this sug-
8. All copies of off-air recordings must include the copyright notice on the broad-
cast programs as recorded.
9. Educational institutions are expected to establish appropriate control procedures
to maintain the integrity of these guidelines.
See also COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20 at 157 (1982).
4. 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). This opinion was one in a series concerning a
quarrel between Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corporation, Learning Corporation of
America, and Time-Life Films, Inc., plaintiffs, and the Board of Cooperative Educational
Services (BOCES), of which C.N. Crooks was a member, defendants. In the prior decision, the
court granted a permanent injunction against BOCES' systematic large-scale off-air videotap-
ing and derivative copies of plaintiffs' works on the basis of copyright laws. Encyclopaedia
Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1188 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); see also
Note, Nonprofit Organization's Use of Videotapes, 4 Loy. ENT. L.J. 41 (1984).
5. 542 F. Supp. at 1158.
6. Id. at 1159.
7. Id. At the commencement of the 1982 lawsuit for a permanent injunction, 15 of the 21
school districts subscribed to the BOCES Videotape Service, and 20 of those 21 districts partic-
ipated in the Film Service.
8. Id. at 1156.
9. Id. at 1188. The permanent injunction action was initiated before January 1, 1978,
and the court's 1982 decision was made under the old Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976).
However, any of the activities including the temporary use activities, are governed by the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the new Act), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
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gestion, BOCES attempted to have the court declare the legality of such
use, and lost.
The new Copyright Act codified the long-recognized doctrine of
"fair use."' 0 In the 1982 decision, the court defined fair use as a "means
of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with the public
interest in dissemination of information affecting [areas of] universal con-
cerns."" Given the Subcommittee's stated goal,' 2 it seems that any use
of copyrighted materials that fulfilled the requirements of the Guidelines
would have the privilege of the "fair use defense."'" The court acknowl-
edged the existence of the Guidelines,'4 but promptly, and without fur-
ther reference to them, examined the facts in light of the traditional four-
prong test for "fair use":
1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educa-
tional purposes;
2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. '"
The failure to consider the case under the Guidelines could have been due
to the court's familiarity with the well established "fair use" criteria.
Further, the court may have failed to see the distinguishing characteris-
tics of this case and those intended to fall within the protection of the
Guidelines, and did not reconcile the two tests for fear of undermining
the legislative effort. However, BOCES' practices fail under either the
four-prong test, or the Guidelines.
The Crooks court began by considering the effect that temporary use
10. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), was the
first decision to use the term "fair use," and to apply the doctrine as a defense to an otherwise
infringing action. See generally 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1982); note
15 infra.
11. 542 F. Supp. at 1178. Accord Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
12. Guidelines, supra notes 1 & 3; See supra text accompanying note 2.
13. The Guidelines supposedly reflected the "Negotiating Committee's consensus as to the
application of 'fair use' to the recording, retention and use of television broadcast programs for
educational purposes." Id. at E4751.
14. 558 F. Supp. at 1250.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (codifying Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The factors are mandatory
criteria to be satisfied rather than just guidelines to be followed. However, "fair use" still
escapes definition and remains an "equitable rule of reason" that must be decided on the facts
of each case. See Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
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would have on plaintiffs' potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work, the fourth prong of the "fair use" test.' 6 The court found that, in
spite of the purported value of free access to educational materials for
temporary classroom use, nothing besides rental fees was preventing in-
terested parties from obtaining the product from the copyright owners.17
All of plaintiffs' works could be rented or leased for short or long periods
of time; some works could be rented for as short a period as one to three
days."8 Thus, the court reasoned, any temporary use by BOCES would
interfere with the marketability of plaintiffs' copyrighted works, and di-
minish the demand for their rentals and leasing. 9 The availability factor
also outweighed the public interest that would be served by BOCES' dis-
tribution of plaintiffs' works.2° The court held that since the "nature of
the copyrighted work," the second prong of the "fair use" test, generally
referred to the type of material used and whether public interest would
be served by its distribution, the ready availability of the works weighed
heavily in plaintiffs' favor.2 The court quickly dismissed the "substanti-
ality" factor, the third prong of the "fair use" test, declaring that BOCES
was only interested in obtaining complete copies of plaintiffs' works.2 2
Considering the first factor last, the court declared that while the
16. This factor, also known as the "harm" factor, is generally considered the most impor-
tant and central consideration. See NIMMER § 13.05 [A][4] (1982). This factor poses the issue
of whether the "unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
(whether in fact engaged in by the defendant or by others) would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market for or value of the plaintiff's work."
Nimmer suggests that the "harm factor" must be considered in conjunction with the func-
tion test, comparing not only the media in which the two works appear, but also the function
that each serves regardless of the media. If it is found that defendant's work performs a differ-
ent function than that of plaintiff's, then the "fair use" defense may be invoked. It would
stretch the imagination to say that BOCES' copy of the copyrighted work performed a differ-
ent function than intended by the plaintiffs; both are used for the same educational purposes.
Therefore, BOCES' practices not only failed the "harm" prong, as the court indicated, but also
the function test.
17. See Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1250.
18. Id. Many types of licensing agreements existed which permitted educational institu-
tions to duplicate plaintiff's works. See Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1164-66.
19. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1250-51. It is, perhaps, vital to the decision that plaintiff
organizations aimed their products at and geared their marketing for educational institutions.
The court's decision may be called a "bread and butter" rationale that would not likely apply
to such television programs as "Roots," which have educational value, but whose copyright
owners are not geared or equipped for the school market.
20. Id. at 1251.
21. Id. The court referred to the Senate Report on the 1976 Copyright Act, which sug-
gested that unavailability of the work through "normal channels" may be "more justification
for reproducing it than in the ordinary case." S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64
(1975). See Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1177.
22. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1251. Generally, the copying of an entire work does not con-
stitute fair use. NIMMER § 13.05 [A][3].
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"purpose and character" of BOCES' use of plaintiffs' works was "to
achieve laudable educational objectives," the specific purpose of the tem-
porary use would be "time shifting."23 Time shifting refers to the ability
of teachers and students to watch television programs irrespective of the
time that program was broadcast on the air.24 The court reasoned that
since "time shifting" was a matter of convenience, and since the "fair
use" doctrine is based instead on reasonableness, BOCES' use of plain-
tiffs' works was unfair.25
The court concluded its determination of the unfairness of BOCES'
practices by stating that, where the copyrighted works are readily avail-
able from their owners for a limited period of time, defendants' copying
and use of those works for a limited period of time does not constitute
fair use.
26
The court's determination was based on the four-prong "fair use"
test, and not on the Guidelines for temporary use. However, the Guide-
lines' purported intent indicates that BOCES' practices were impermissi-
ble under them as well.
The first possible distinguishing characteristic is that the "guidelines
were developed to apply only to off-air recording by non-profit educa-
tional institutions."' 27 Although BOCES is a non-profit organization, it is
not an educational institution per se, but a service organization for educa-
tors. Thus, the court could have limited the application of the Guidelines
to the educators themselves.28
Also, the Guidelines provide that off-air recordings may be made
23. Id. This was later contradicted as the court stated that BOCES' "primary purpose in
its off-the-air videotaping. . . was to provide videotapes to school teachers." Id. at 1253.
24. Id. Time shifting may be achieved by programming a videotape machine in advance to
record a television program, and then by playing back the videotape at the convenience of the
viewer. See Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1163.
25. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1251. The court quoted the Senate Report on the 1976 Copy-
right Act: "The Committee does not intend to suggest... that off-the-air recording for con-
venience would under any circumstances, be considered 'fair use.'" S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1975). However, the court's use of Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061,
1070 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1977), for this proposition is unclear. The Meero-
pol court used the reasonableness concept with regard to the substantiality of copying. More
important, however, is the holding of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., -
U.S.- 104 S. Ct. 774, 792-93 (1984), that "time shifting" was reasonable. Therefore, this part
of the opinion is probably no longer valid. However, this would probably not alter the out-
come of Crooks, given the great weight that the "harm factor" carries.
26. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1251. The court stressed that this decision applied only to the
facts of this case.
27. Guidelines, No. 1, supra notes 1 & 3.
28. In his October 14, 1981, presentation to the House of Representatives, Congressman
Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee, used the terms "educators" and "educational
institutions" interchangeably, which suggests that the Guidelines were intended only for the
1985]
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only at the request of teachers and may not be regularly recorded in an-
ticipation of requests.29 BOCES' practices would have to undergo major
changes in order to fulfill this guideline, including the destruction of its
videotape library and catalog service.3" Neither did BOCES provide any
controls for the erasures of the tapes as required by the guidelines."a
Perhaps the most important reason for BOCES' failure to meet the
Guidelines is the caveat in the letter accompanying them. "Within the
guidelines, the Negotiating Committee does not intend that off-air re-
cordings by teachers under fair use be permitted to be intentionally sub-
stituted in the school curriculum for a standard practice of purchase or
license of the same educational material by the institution concerned." 2
BOCES' furnishing teachers with copies of plaintiffs' copyrighted works
for temporary use would do exactly what the Guidelines warn against:
infringe on the rights of copyright owners of the educational programs,
the rental and leasing of which is part of the "standard practice" of edu-
cational institutions. Therefore, BOCES' suggested temporary use prac-
tices, failing both the four-prong "fair use" test and the intent of the
Guidelines, do not constitute "fair use."
The current code gives the court discretion in awarding costs and
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.33 The former Copyright Act,
however, rendered the award of costs mandatory.34 As the suit was initi-
ated under the former Act, the court did not have any discretion and
awarded plaintiffs the costs of this action. 5
On the issue of attorneys' fees, plaintiffs were not so fortunate. Both
the current and former Copyright Acts provide for a discretionary award
protection of teachers and schools. However, it could also be argued that BOCES simply steps
into the shoes of those teachers and that the limitation is not justified.
29. Guidelines, No. 4, supra notes 1 & 3.
30. The holdings of BOCES' library were made known to teachers through a catalog. The
1975-1976 edition of the catalog listed close to 5,000 "master" videotapes, copies of which
were available at teachers' requests. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1162-63. This type of operation
seems to be precisely what the guidelines intended to prevent.
31. Guidelines, No. 9, supra notes 1 & 3.
32. Guidelines at E4751, supra note 1. This August 31, 1981 letter was addressed to Con-
gressman Kastenmeier from Elleen D. Cooke and Leonard Wasser, Co-chairs of the Negotiat-
ing Committee.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982). See generally NIMMER § 14.09.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976); see also Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460, 461 (2d Cir.
1925); H.M. Kolbe Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 315 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1963). But see Har-
rington v. Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), where the court ignored this provi-
sion and refused to allow costs to either side. See generally NIMMER § 14.09.
35. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1251-52 (citing Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp.
908, 912 n.4 (D. Conn. 1980)).
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of reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.3 6 Since the award of
attorneys' fees is generally characterized as a penalty to the losing party
as well as compensation for the prevailing party, courts examine the in-
tentions of the losing party in pursuing the suit.37 Generally, attorneys'
fees may be awarded if the losing party intentionally infringes, acts in
bad faith, or brings and conducts the litigation in an unreasonable fash-
ion.38 Plaintiffs' motion for award of attorneys' fees was based on de-
fendants' alleged bad faith and disregard of prominently displayed
copyright notices.39 The court cited Roy Export v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System' for the proposition that a determination of bad faith de-
pends largely on whether defendants genuinely believed that, despite the
copyright they had the legal right to use the materials.4" Although
BOCES' defenses were ultimately declared meritless, the novelty and
complexity of the off-the-air videotaping issues justified the denial of
plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees.42
The court next considered the types of infringements committed by
BOCES and regarded the old Copyright Act as binding.43 Plaintiffs
claimed that defendants had committed both vending and performance
infringements under the old Copyright Act."
Plaintiffs insisted that each time BOCES videotaped their work at a
teacher's request or, broadcast one of the copyrighted works at a
teacher's request or via its closed circuit transmission system, it "sold"
the copy, thus committing "vending" infringements under former Sec-
tion 1(a).4" The court, however, agreed with BOCES' characterization of
its services as a "sale agreement," rather than a "buy-sell" contract, rea-
soning that the service aspect of the services predominated over the sales
36. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
37. See generally, NIMMER § 14. 1O[D].
38. Id.
39. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1252. The court denied this motion in the 1982 decision. The
court reasoned that, if the area of the law in question is "novel, unsettled, or complex," the
award of attorneys' fees should be denied. 542 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
40. 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
41. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1252.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1254.
44. Id. at 1253. 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1976) of the old Copyright Act entitles a copyright
owner to five exclusive rights: to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § l(d) gives the copyright owner the right to perform or represent the copyrighted
work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) for the corresponding provisions of the new Copy-
right Act.
45. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1253. Although the statute did not define "vending," it im-
plied a prohibition of unauthorized sales. Id. (citing Platt & Munk Co. v. Playmore, Inc., 218
F. Supp. 267, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified & affid, 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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aspect.46 However, in light of the new Copyright Act's protection of the
copyright holder's right to "distribute" their works,47 the owner may
have greater rights.48
Plaintiffs, however, persuaded the court that BOCES did commit
performance infringements in violation of Section l(d).49 Plaintiffs in-
sisted that each time a copy of one of their 19 copyrighted works was
shown in a classroom, a public performance violation occurred. 50 De-
fendants attempted several arguments to counter the performance in-
fringement contention. The court rejected the argument that plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that each
tape was shown at least once in a classroom upon referring to teachers'
testimony given at trial. 51 BOCES' also argued that, since New York
state statutes place restrictions on who may attend classes and enter
classrooms, the performances of their works were "private" rather than
"public." 52 The court disagreed, holding that considering the nature of
the audience, "public school students with a common purpose and inter-
est in education," the performances were public.53
BOCES further claimed that their cable television transmissions
were not "performances" within the meaning of the statute and the deci-
sions in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,54 Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.," and Fortnightly Corp. v. United
46. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1253 (quoting Win. H. Wise & Co. v. Rand McNally & Co.,
195 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1961): ("Where service predominates.., it is a contract for
work, labor and materials and not a sale.")).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982) gives copyright owners the exclusive right "to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."
48. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1254.
49. See supra note 44.
50. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1254.
51. Id.
52. Id. Only public performances of copyrighted works are infringements. The new Act
defines "publicly" as "at a place open to the public or at any place where substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered .... "
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Under the old Act, however, there were two competing lines of cases,
one holding that as long as the audience was limited to a particular group and not open to the
general public, the performance was private. The second line of cases, which this court joined,
held that as long as a substantial segment of the public could attend, the performance was
"public". See generally NIMMER § 8.14[C].
53. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1254-55.
54. 442 U.S. 151, 162-63 (1975) (radio reception of broadcast of copyrighted musical com-
positions did not constitute a "performance").
55. 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974) ("importation of 'distant' signals from one community into
another does not constitute 'performance' under the Copyright Act").
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Artists Television, Inc.5" The court distinguished Twentieth Century on
factual grounds, and used Fortnightly and Teleprompter for the proposi-
tion that where a broadcaster has the ability to "select, procure, and
propagate programs to the public," that broadcaster "performs" within
the meaning of the Act.5 Denying defense's argument, the court rea-
soned that BOCES conducted these very activities as part of their service,
and, therefore, "performed." 58
Having struck down all of defendants' contentions regarding "pub-
lic performance," and having decided that BOCES was guilty of per-
formance infringements, the court proceeded to examine the number of
such infringements, using two standard tests for this determination: the
"time test" and the "heterogenity test." 9 The "time test" is concerned
with the proximity in time that the infringements are repeated, and is
used to determine whether the violations are multiple infringements or
one continuous infringement. The "heterogenity test" refers to the na-
ture of infringements in examining whether successive infringements
should be considered as one." Taking into account defendants' failure to
provide evidence of the continuous or repetitious nature of the infringe-
ments, the court found that separate copying infringements occurred
under Section l(a) when BOCES made five original master tapes of the
copyrighted works, and when it duplicated plaintiffs' works from each of
the 19 master tapes.61 The court further decided that a separate public
performance infringement occurred each time a videotape copy was de-
livered to schools and shown in a classroom. Also, an infringement oc-
curred each time BOCES broadcast one of the copyrighted works via its
closed circuit television system.62
Notwithstanding the finding of infringements, BOCES pleaded igno-
rance and innocence. It contended that the individual defendants could
not be held directly or contributorily liable for copyright violations
where the infringers had no knowledge that their activities were, indeed,
violative of the copyright laws.63 BOCES also claimed that, because it
did not have a direct financial stake, it could not be held vicariously lia-
56. 392 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1968) (one who manually or by human agency merely actuates
electrical instrumentalities does not "perform" within the meaning of the Copyright Act).
57. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1255.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1255-56. This defense of innocent intent does not serve as a defense to liability,
but it may affect the remedies available against the defendant. See generally NIMMER § 13.08.
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ble for the infringing activities." The court disagreed, holding that the
individual defendants, as BOCES' employees and members of the Board,
caused and materially contributed to the public performance of the sub-
ject copyrighted works in the classrooms. They were, therefore, all
jointly and severally liable.65
The court further ordered that plaintiffs were entitled to statutory
damages of $250.00 for each infringement committed by BOCES.6 6 In
the 1982 decision, the court conceded that there was no clear consensus
with regard to the applicable rule in awarding statutory damages rather
than actual damages and defendants' profits.67 The determination re-
sulted in a difference between $93,000 claimed by the plaintiffs in statu-
tory damages6" and $265.00 admitted by the defendants as actual
damages.69 In 1982, the court had refused to make the determination in
light of the inadequate analysis of the number of infringements actually
commited by BOCES.7° In 1983, however, the court was satisfied with
the discussion of the "time" and "heterogenity" tests, and awarded plain-
tiffs the $250.00 in damages for each copying and performance violation
committed by BOCES.7 The plaintiffs were directed to submit an affida-
vit of costs and the total number of copying and performance
64. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1255-56. It is generally held that if one has knowledge that an
infringement is taking place, and causes another to infringe, the person so causing the infringe-
ment will be held liable. Moreover, even in the absence of any financial stake or supervision of
the infringing activity by one with such knowledge, one may still be held as a related defend-
ant. See NIMMER § 12.04 [A]. It seems then that for this argument to have merit, BOCES
must have been both ignorant of the infringements and disinterested in their subsequent use.
But cf Sony Corp. of Am., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789 (1984), in which the court held that suppliers of
videotape equipment were not contributorily liable even if they knew that their equipment
might be used for infringing activities. However, this facet of the decision must be considered
together with the Supreme Court's determination that time-shifting constituted fair use.
Therefore, contributory liability could not exist where primary liability did not.
65. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1256.
66. Id. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) of the old Act provided for an award "in lieu of actual
damages and profits, such damages as the court shall appear to be just .. " Since it is often
difficult to prove actual damages and defendants' profits from the infringement, plaintiffs may
choose to ask for $250.00 statutory damages per infringement. See generally NIMMER § 14.01
[B]; see also Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1185-86.
67. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1185-86.
68. Id. at 1185. Plaintiffs claimed that BOCES infringed a total of 372 times at $250.00
per infringement. Although plaintiffs would have been entitled to defendants' profits, statutory
damages against a non-profit corporation were much more lucrative for the plaintiffs.
69. Id. BOCES calculated actual damages to be the price of one additional print film
which might have been purchased by the Film Service.
70. Id.
71. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. at 1256.
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infringements.72
The importance of this decision lies primarily in its implied limita-
tion of the application of the congressional Guidelines. At first glance,
this decision would seem to contradict the intent of the legislature in
providing the guidelines in order to encourage education. It would also
seem that the court encouraged BOCES to bring a motion to allow tem-
porary use, and then refused it. However, in order for educational insti-
tutions to enjoy the use (free or otherwise) of these educational
programs, their makers must be encouraged to produce them. If such
non-profit organizations as BOCES are allowed to provide educational
institutions with free rentals of videotapes that would otherwise be a fi-
nancial encouragement and compensation to the makers of the films,
then, perhaps, BOCES will have nothing or little to copy after a certain
period of time. BOCES' efforts were laudable, but such service organiza-
tions will probably be obliged to make licensing agreements with copy-
right holders for the use of copyrighted works before providing them to
educational institutions.
Natasha Roit
72. Id. It must be kept in mind that the total damages should be substantially lower than
$93,000 as that figure included the alleged vending infringements which the court struck down.
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2. Copyright Royalty Tribunal's Second Distribution Withstands
Challenge
The royalties paid to copyright owners for the use of their works are
usually established in the marketplace. The producers and creators of
programs maintain exclusive control of their product and attempt to ne-
gotiate the best possible price for it in a competitive market. In the case
of cable retransmission of television and radio programs, however, indi-
vidual negotiations between copyright owners and users would entail in-
ordinately high transaction costs.' For this reason, the 1976 Copyright
Revision Act ("the Act") granted cable operators a compulsory license
to offer the secondary transmission of copyrighted material carried by
broadcast stations.2 In exchange for this compulsory license, cable oper-
ators must pay royalty fees which the Copyright Royalty Tribunal ("the
Tribunal")3 distributes to the registered owners of the program's
copyright.4
Although the compulsory license applies to all cable system pro-
gramming authorized by the FCC,5 the Act imposes royalties only for
the carriage of non-network programming on television or radio stations
carried beyond their local service areas.6 The Tribunal initiated the first
1. The operation of cable systems typically involves the reception of broadcast beams by
means of special antennae and the transmission of these signals by cable or other methods to
the homes of subscribers.
2. 17 U.S.C. §I l(c) (1976). (All United States Code Sections hereinafter cited refer to
1976 version unless otherwise stated).
3. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is a governmental agency authorized to make an an-
nual distribution of royalty fees paid by cable operators for the retransmission of copyrighted
programming. Congress intended that the Tribunal operate as a substitute for direct negotia-
tions between the cable operators and copyright owners. The Copyright Act vests the Tribu-
nal with broad discretion in apportioning these royalties. Specific awards are reversible only if
the Tribunal's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" as defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 for
function and organization of Tribunal [hereinafter cited as "the Act"].
4. 17 U.S.C. § 11Il(d)(2).
5. The Act's compulsory license enables cable systems to offer essentially three types of
basic service to subscribers: (1) the signals of local stations that are otherwise poorly received;
(2) national programming from affiliates of the three commercial networks, regardless of the
location of the broadcast station; and (3) non-network or syndicated programming originating
in a community distant from the cable system. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89
(1976), cited in National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176,
179 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d)(4)(A). The rationale underlying the non-network distinction is
that copyright owners of non-network programming are already compensated by the networks
because their works reach the entire nation; therefore cable systems should not be required to
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royalty distribution under this scheme in 1979 for cable royalties paid for
the 1978 calendar year. In Christian Broadcasting Network v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, ("CBN"),8 the District of Columbia Circuit analyzed
the Tribunal's treatment of conflicting claims for cable royalties follow-
ing distribution for the 1979 calendar year.9 Approving in large part the
Tribunal's allocation of royalties for both the 1978 and 1979 distribu-
tions, the court stressed that the Tribunal's percentage allocation was not
reviewable as long as it was within a "zone of reasonableness." 0
In 1976 the House Judiciary Committee adopted a fee schedule in
which the Tribunal was authorized to adjust the royalty rates to account
only for inflation and FCC deregulation. However, the Committee did
provide the Tribunal with some limited guidance on the factors that
should be taken into account, emphasizing the economic impact on the
copyright owners and on the broadcasters.II Compulsory license fees are
based upon a percentage of the gross receipts of the cable system for a
semi-annual accounting period.12 The fees are paid into the Register of
Copyrights 3 for later distribution by the Tribunal. 4 All claimants must
file with the Tribunal in order to be eligible to receive royalty fees.1 5
provide double compensation to these owners. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
90 (1976).
Advertisers who support network programming reach a larger audience through cable
retransmission. This permits the originating station to raise its advertising rates in order to
compensate the producers for the increased airing of their shows. However, the market does
not compensate the owners of non-network programming which is initially broadcast in com-
munities remote from the cable system. Such programming is generally sponsored by local
advertisers with little or no interest in a distant cable system.
7. See Sunshine Act Meeting Notice, 44 Fed. Reg. 47,440 (1979) (requesting views on
whether the Tribunal should declare the existence of a controversy). The Tribunal's first dis-
tribution was affirmed in almost all respects by the same court that heard the later case that is
the topic of this note. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d
367 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
8. 720 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983). CBN is only one of twelve parties appealing and/or
intervening in the Tribunal's decision.
9. Although various challenges were brought regarding the 1980 annual distribution, the
cases were subsequently vacated and remanded to the Tribunal in light of the court's decision
of CBN. See 1980 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,552 (1983).
10. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1304.
11. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, 176 (1976).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § I 1l(d)(2)(B),(C) and (D). If the semi-annual gross receipts of a cable
system are over $214,000, the compulsory license fee is assessed on the basis of "Distant Signal
Equivalents." These are defined under Section 11 1(f) as the value assigned to the secondary
transmissions of non-network programming carried in whole or in part beyond the local ser-
vice area of the transmitter.
13. Id. at § Ill(d)(3).
14. Id. at § Ill(d)(4).
15. Id. at § 111(d)(5)(A).
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
Each year after receiving the claims, the Tribunal determines whether a
controversy exists concerning the royalty distribution.
In CBN, twelve parties disputed the Tribunal's allocation of the $20
million in royalties which were paid into the fund.' 6 Although in one
sense the host of conflicting claims reflects a "boundless litigiousness [on
the part of] disappointed claimants,"17 in another sense, this is a natural
reaction in an industry that is expected to grow enormously in future
years. 18 Congress provided the Tribunal with very few guidelines, stating
that, "It would not be appropriate to specify particular, limiting stan-
dards for distribution [of the cable royalties]," and left it to the Tribunal
to develop criteria on the basis of all "pertinent data and relevant consid-
erations presented by the claimants."' 9
By the time of the 1979 distribution, the Tribunal had attempted to
develop a marketplace system of valuation for allocating the royalties.
The CBN court reviewed the Tribunal's decision under two main criteria:
(1) the Tribunal had a duty to consider all evidence of economic harm to
the claimants; and (2) the court's deference to the distribution decisions
where the Tribunal's intent could be discerned.
The Tribunal relied on five distribution criteria that it employed in
its 1978 proceedings. The primary factors considered were: the harm
suffered by copyright owners whose works were retransmitted; the bene-
fit derived by cable systems; and the marketplace value of the works
transmitted. A second tier of considerations were: the quality of the
copyrighted material and time-related considerations (i.e., how long cer-
tain programming was played on the air).2° In applying these criteria to
the 1979 proceeding however, the Tribunal noted that the "harm" test
was of limited utility because there was little concrete evidence to prove
that cable retransmissions had harmed one group more than any other.2'
16. The Act specifically provides that these claimants, notwithstanding any provisions of
the Antitrust laws, "may agree among themselves as to the proportionate division of [the fund]
. . . [and] may lump their claims together and file them jointly. . . or may designate a com-
mon agent to receive payment on their behalf." 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d)(5)(A).
17. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1319.
18. The growth in the value of cable television stocks versus the performance of the stock
market as a whole illustrates cable's phenomenal growth. The average price of a share in the
cable index rose from approximately six dollars in 1976 to a record high of $111 in 1982.
During this same period, the Dow Jones Industrial average rose only twenty-two percent.
Hatfield & Garrett, A Re-examination of Cable Television's Compulsory Licensing Royalty
Rates: The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the Marketplace, 30 J. COPR. Soc'v 433, 458
(1983).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 89, 97 (1976).
20. 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026, 63,035 (1980).
21. See 1979 cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 47 Fed. Reg. 9,879, 9,899 (1982)
(parties unable to provide more than "theories" or "anecdotal evidence" of harm).
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Accordingly, the Tribunal focused on those factors that helped appraise
the compensable marketplace value of the claimants' ability to exploit
their works.
The 1979 proceeding was conducted in two separate phases. Phase I
allocated the fund among various groups of claimants.22 In Phase II,
disputes, if any, among claimants within each group were resolved. In
CBN, the Phase II proceeding involved almost entirely a dispute between
the members of the program syndicator and movie producer groups
which had been allocated 70% of the fund.23
Six parties appealed their royalty allocations. While affirming the
Tribunal's decision in most respects, the court, however, dealt in depth
with the cases of two claimants: a group of religious broadcasters known
collectively as the Devotional Claimants and the National Association of
Broadcasters ("NAB"). Their claims were remanded for further consid-
eration and a clearer articulation of the reasoning used by the Tribunal.
The Christian Broadcasting Network, Old-Time Gospel Hour and
PTL Television Network ("the Devotional Claimants") are the copyright
owners of television programs with varying degrees of religious themes.24
Despite the differences in their programs, they all share several common
organizational and financial attributes. Each distributes its programs to
22. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1301.
Program Syndicators and Movie Producers ............................ 70%
Joint Sports Claim ants* ............................................. 15%
Public Broadcasting Service .......................................... 5.25%
U.S. T.V. Broadcasters .............................................. 4.50%
Music Performing Rights Societies* .................................. 4.25%
Canadian T.V. Broadcasting ......................................... 0.75%
National Public Radio .............................................. 0.25%
Comm ercial Radio ................................................. 0.00%
* The Joint Sports Claimants ("JSC") are comprised of major league baseball, basketball,
hockey and soccer leagues.
Consisting of ASCAP and BMI.
23. Id.
Motion Picture Association of America ............................... 96.8%
Multimedia Program Productions .................................... 1.6%
National Association of Broadcasters ................................. 0.8%
Spanish International Network ....................................... 0.7%
M utual of Om aha .................................................. 0.1%
Christian Broadcasting Network ...................................... 0.0%
PTL N etwork ..................................................... 0.0%
Old Time Gospel Hour ............................................. 0.0%
24. CBN, for example, is the syndicator and producer of twenty-two programs. The most
widely known is "The 700 Club", a daily program consisting of "55 '/2 minutes of public
affairs material, 8 minutes of entertainment and 7 '/2 minutes of religion." Brief for CBN, cited
in CBN, 720 F.2d at 1308. PTL Television Network produces and distributes two live pro-
grams daily. The Old Time Gospel Hour is a weekly one hour service conducted by Reverend
Jerry Falwell.
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broadcasting stations with the understanding that no commercial inter-
ruptions are to be allowed. For this reason, each pays broadcasters to air
their shows, reversing the usual arrangement in which the broadcaster
pays the producer for a program and then capitalizes on the program
through the use of advertising.25 The three organizations use their pro-
grams as vehicles for soliciting call-in donations.26
The Tribunal denied the Devotional Claimants any award on two
grounds. First, it found that the Devotional programming was "funda-
mentally distinct" in that it had no marketplace value due to the distinct
arrangement whereby the program's producers paid the broadcasters to
air it. Second, the Tribunal could find no evidence of harm by cable
retransmission of the Devotional programming. Rather, the Tribunal
found that the Devotional Claimants derived a benefit because an ex-
panded viewing audience could provide a source of additional donations.
The court found these explanations to be perfectly reasonable at first
blush. However, when measured against the Tribunal's dissimilar treat-
ment of other similarly situated claimants, the decision took on an air of
"unexplained arbitrariness. '27
The court did not find the idea that there was a fundamental distinc-
tion in the non-commercial religious broadcasting necessarily irrational.
But it did object to the Tribunal's complete failure to discuss the counter-
arguments offered. For example, the Devotional Claimants contended
that their payments to the broadcasters could not be interpreted as an
external indication of market worthlessness since they reflected the con-
scious, self-inflicted cost of commercial-free formatting.2" The Tribunal
also ignored the argument that the market value of the Devotional pro-
gramming was reflected in the value which viewers place on it and are
willing to pay to support it through donations. The court held that these
failures to address the Devotionals' arguments did not in themselves viti-
ate the Tribunal's "fundamental distinction" theory. However, their
conspicuous failure to discuss these relevant aspects of the Devotionals'
case made it difficult for the court to appraise the reasonableness of the
25. Id.
26. Id. Indeed, each of these organizations finances its production and distribution costs
entirely from viewer contributions.
27. Id. at 1309.
28. See, e.g., Tribunal Summary of PTL's Evidentiary Position, 47 Fed. Reg. 9,890-9,891
(1982): "Religious programmers choose not to mix advertising with their programming in
order to retain freedom of expression ...." CBN Exhibit 1, JA 450-51, cited in CBN, 720
F.2d at 1309: "Interspersing such programs with product commercials would be as offensive
and out of place as billboards in a church or synagogue."
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Tribunal's response to the evidence.29 In the words of the court,
"[m]easured in light of these awards, the Tribunal's 'fundamental dis-
tinction' begins to take on the texture of quicksilver."3
Two of the three primary criteria which the Tribunal examined were
the benefit derived by cable systems and the harm suffered by the copy-
right owners. When discussing the Sports Claimants' presentation, the
Tribunal found that the benefit of boosted subscription rates was "the
marketplace consideration we have found most persuasive and useful."3
The Devotional Claimants offered alot of testimony to show their pro-
gramming had attracted a large, steady audience, and that a notable
number of cable stations now carried their programs.32 However, the
Tribunal either disregarded or simply chose not to discuss the benefit
derived by cable systems from the Devotional programming, concluding
that the Devotional Claimants suffered no harm. The CBN court found
this disregard of evidence a "tell-tale [indicator] of capriciousness.
33
The court indicated that, while it did not necessarily interpret this evi-
dence to require an award to the Devotional Claimants, the evidence was
too similar to evidence proffered by other parties (National Public Radio
and Public Broadcasting System) awarded royalties to be discounted.
As owners of their own satellite networks, the Devotional Claimants
alleged that the fact that their programs were available throughout most
of the day on retranssmitted cable made it significantly more difficult for
them to place their satellite networks with other cable systems that felt
that their area already had enough of this programming. This "over-
airing" also made it less likely for the Devotional programming to be
shown during prime-time when viewership and contributions would be at
their maximum. The Tribunal refused to recognize this claim, stating
that Section 111 was not designed to provide compensation to satellite
networks.34
The court partially agreed with the Tribunal's limitation. The gen-
eral revenue losses of the Devotional Claimants' satellite networks (due
to their inability to sell their programs to cable stations who could al-
ready pick up the same programs) were not compensable. This situation
29. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1310.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. A letter from a cable station to CBN states: "Your program [The 700 Club] has
attracted a very loyal and dedicated audience that appears to be gradually increasing all the
time." The testimony of a former CBN executive indicated that a notable number of stations
qualifying under the FCC carried CBN programming.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1312.
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merely illustrates the compulsory licensing system at work. Copyright
royalties are not designed to compensate satellite networks for the gen-
eral loss of business. However, if the Devotional Claimants as copyright
owners could specifically prove that cable retransmission had measurably
diminished their contribution potential, the court declared such loss
should be covered by the scope of Section 111. " This analysis seems
accurate in that it considers the essence of copyright protection. It is the
nature and purpose of the work created (a program which seeks to move
the viewer to support the religious view being preached) to solicit finan-
cial support.
The Devotional Claimants' final argument concentrated on cable's
manipulation of audience demographics. They offered evidence of eco-
nomic harm resulting from "fractionalization," or the splitting up of a
program's local audience block because of the distant signal importation
of their own or similar programs. The court found that the Tribunal was
authorized to consider evidence of this type of economic harm. In its
1978 proceeding, the Tribunal had admitted that "there is a further ad-
verse economic impact on a copyright owner from the importation of
competing distant works into the aggrieved party's local community."36
This is the Devotional Claimants' identical situation, although they had
not argued it in the 1978 appeal.
The court concluded that there was a very real possibility that the
benefit of cable to the Devotional Claimants in the form of increased
contributions and support might outweigh its economic harms. But it
saw no reason why this benefit factor should completely foreclose any
award or prevent full consideration of the evidence presented. 7
In its appeal of royalty allocations, the NAB revived two claims
raised in the 1978 proceeding: one on behalf of sports events telecasters;
the other for commercial radio broadcasters. Both groups requested a
greater percentile allocation of the fund on the grounds that their broad-
casts are creative compilations, increasing the intrinsic worth of the
programming.
35. Id. The court acknowledged that, "Although it appears to us that proving such an
attenuated loss would be extremely difficult, competent evidence of such a harm would not be
beyond the power of the Tribunal to evaluate." Id.
36. 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026, 63,035 (1980).
37. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1313. The Tribunal recently announced the procedures it will follow
to implement the court's remand decision: "The Tribunal will not receive further evidence on
the matters of Devotional Claimants. . .will permit all interested parties to participate in the
consideration of the Devotional Claimants' remand . .. [and] will permit parties to submit
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Copyright Law Reports, No. 75,
Sept. 24, 1984, Copyright Royalty Tribunal Notices, 48 Fed. Reg. 55,498, 10,601-10,602
(1983).
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The NAB claimed that some of the funds distributed to the Joint
Sports Claimants ("JSC") should have been instead allocated to the tele-
vision sports broadcasters for their creative contributions to the pro-
gramming. They introduced evidence to demonstrate the manner in
which broadcasters' efforts-such as instant replay, split screens and
play-by-play commentaries-add to the over-all quality of a sports tele-
cast.38 In support of this "broadcast day as a compilation" theory, the
NAB argued that cable operators do not retransmit individual programs
selectively but merely pick up the broadcasts of particular stations in
their entirety. The broadcast stations select the optimum mix and ar-
rangements of their programming based on such factors as audience
demographics, competing broadcasts, seasonal changes and audience
flow from one program to the next.
39
The Tribunal reiterated the view it had expressed in its 1978 deter-
mination that, in the absence of specific contractual provisions, Congress
clearly intended to award cable royalties for sports programming to the
sports leagues." However, in NAB v. CRT, the circuit court squarely
rejected the Tribunal's interpretation of the Act, finding instead that
Congress did seem to contemplate Tribunal recognition of the copyright-
able interests of broadcasters. This belief is illustrated by the House
Report:
When a football game is being covered by four television cam-
eras, with a director guiding the activities of the four camer-
amen and choosing which of their electronic images are sent
out to the public . . . there is little doubt that what the camer-
amen and what the director are doing is what constitutes
"authorship."'"
Although the Tribunal acknowledged telecasters' copyright potential in
38. The NAB argued that the broadcast stations expended considerable time and effort in
compiling a broadcast day and suggested that this type of programming fell within the Act's
definition of a copyrightable compilation work since it was "a work formed by the collection
and assembling of pre-existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."
17 U.S.C. § 101.
39. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 377 n.
13 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
40. 1978 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,026, 63,035 (1980),
cited in CBN, 720 F.2d at 1315. The Sports leagues originally sought federal copyright protec-
tion in order to control the unauthorized retransmissions of their broadcasts by cable systems.
Once fixed, a live sports telecast qualifies for copyright protection as a "motion picture" and
"audiovisual work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6).
41. NAB, 675 F.2d at 378 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665 (1976). The court refers to, among other
things, the "banter" of Howard Cosell and Don Meredith, adding that, "Anyone who has ever
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the 1978 proceedings, their interests were found to be quantitatively de
minimis. The Tribunal observed that broadcast compilations had mini-
mal market value because the public views sports broadcasts primarily to
see the sports performance, and not the work of the director or
cameramen.
4 2
Perhaps learning from its mistakes, the NAB did attempt to intro-
duce evidence of the value of their contributions in the 1979 proceedings.
The NAB claimed that in thirty-six and one-half percent of the 1979
sports telecasts, U.S. television broadcasters created the programs and
did not assign the copyrights to sports teams.43 It argued that television
broadcasters are either the sole or joint authors of these broadcasts. Re-
gardless of the merits of the NAB's ownership claim, it had not been
permitted to raise it before the Tribunal in 1979, and consequently, was
not properly raised upon appeal. The court remanded, noting, "[w]e ex-
pect that NAB will be allowed to raise its authorship/joint authorship
claim to the Tribunal on remand."'  However, the Tribunal was not
mandated to award the broadcasters any royalties for their contributions
to sports telecasts.45
Prior to the court's ruling in CBN, the Tribunal was involved in its
1980 proceeding. It appeared to make the very evaluation which the
CBN court suggested was possible, concluding that the broadcasters'
contributions were de minimis and did not warrant any increase in their
award. 6 The broadcasters and sports interests ultimately resolved their
differences before the Tribunal in a settlement providing that the sports
clubs would continue to receive all royalties unless broadcasters entered
watched Monday night football. . . knows that such effects as instant plays in slow motion
add immensely to the quality of sports telecasts." NAB, 675 F.2d at 378.
42. Id. at 379. The court also observed that, "[T]he record is void of any useful evidence
that local broadcasters are harmed by cable carriage in distant markets of their locally pro-
duced programs, and it is quite possible that distant carriage of local broadcasts is considerably
beneficial to television broadcasters because the enlarged audience increases the reach of com-
mercial advertising." See supra note 6 and accompanying text for contra argument. The Act
prohibits cable systems from altering commercials carried on retransmitted programs. 17
U.S.C. § 11 1(c)(3). CBN did not discuss the harm/benefit test in relation to the NAB's claims.
43. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1316.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1315-16.
46. The 1980 Tribunal Decision stated: "[T]he contribution of the broadcasters as com-
pared with that of the teams is minimal. . . . We find no evidence in our record, including
that of the NAB sports witnesses, establishing that the contribution of the sports broadcasters
in any significant respect contributes to a cable operator's interest in sports programming, or in
the decision of an individual to subscribe to cable television. . . . We do not find it creditable
that a cable subscriber would pass up viewing a game involving teams competing for the pen-
nant to watch a Chicago Cubs game because of the quality of the Cubs telecast." 1980 Cable
Royalty Distribution Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 9,552, 9,565-66 (1983).
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into separate contract negotiations with the clubs.47
Commercial radio broadcasters received no royalty allocations in
either the 1978 or 1979 proceedings. In the 1978 determination, the ra-
dio claimants were unable to distinguish the extent of the distant carriage
of their signals due to technical inadequacies in the information gather-
ing procedures used by the Copyright Office. Lacking any demonstration
of marketplace value, the record was inadequate to support a finding that
the retransmission of radio signals caused the radio stations any harm.4"
The Tribunal's 1979 decision to refrain from awarding any royalties
to commercial radio broadcasters was based on its finding that radio's
value in the commercial marketplace was de minimis. The court rejected
the NAB's contention that the Tribunal's failure to award royalties to
commercial radio was inconsistent with the 0.25% Phase I award to Na-
tional Public Radio ("NPR").49 NPR was awarded royalties due to its
innovative and distinctive quality radio programming.50
However, no such consistency existed between the Tribunal's award
to music claimants (part of which was necessarily allocated to music
played on the radio), and failure to award any royalties to commercial
radio. The music claimants introduced evidence that approximately sev-
enty percent of the total commercial FM radio airtime is occupied by
music. This reliance on on-the-air time, like quality, was one of the Tri-
bunal's secondary criteria. Although the Tribunal found the record of
the music claimants not entirely clear, the seventy percent total of the
copyrighted music permitted the Tribunal to issue an award of four and
one-quarter percent.5 Yet the Tribunal was unable to discern any mar-
ketplace value whatsoever for all distant commercial radio carriage.
Upon examination, the reasoning used to distinguish between the music
and commercial radio claimants blurred. The Tribunal recognized the
contribution of "formatting" (akin to the television broadcaster's compi-
47. This was the method originally advanced by the Tribunal as the only way the broad-
casters could collect on their compilation theory. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1315.
48. NAB, 675 F.2d at 379.
49. Although the NAB introduced evidence which attempted to demonstrate the benefit of
radio carriage to cable, the court found only a de minimis interest. Various testimony from
people in the cable industries was offered, asserting that: cable stations do not even attempt to
ascertain the number of FM radio connections; cable carriage of radio signals at this point is
not a significant factor in the radio broadcasting industry. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1316.
50. Id. at 1317. The evidence offered to support the conclusion that NPR produced dis-
tinctive programming included the fact that NPR received 100 times as many awards as did
commercial radio, as well as exhibits of letters of support from distant cable listeners. Given
these documented differences in quality, the court found that the Tribunal's exceedingly small
award of 0.25% was well within the "zone of reasonableness."
51. 47 Fed. Reg. 9,894 (1982).
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lation theory) to radio's appeal when offered in testimonies for public
radio. However, it relied upon the opinion of a witness for the music
claimants who claimed that commercial radio has only a few inter-
changeable formats which are present in every commercial market, so
that the appeal of an imported commercial signal is very limited.5 2 Re-
gardless of the programming's level of appeal, the court noted that this
testimony provided a questionable basis on which to completely foreclose
broadcasters from any award because of the "ubiquity" of their program-
ming-while simultaneously granting an award to music claimants be-
cause their music was played a ubiquitous seventy percent of the time. 3
The court therefore set aside both the award to the music claimants and
the non-award to the commercial radio claimants as arbitrary and re-
manded these aspects of the Tribunal's decision.
The decision-making latitude of the Tribunal remains wide and is
bound only by the court's review for an even-handed application of
awards within a zone of reasonableness. A clear presentation of evidence
of either benefit or harm structured in the monetary terms of the market-
place is the paramount requirement. If the claimants follow this proce-
dure and show something greater than a de minimis benefit or general
revenue loss, they will not be precluded from recovering.
However, the royalty rates under compulsory licensing must be ex-
amined in a larger context. Congress established the compulsory licens-
ing rates to help promote the availability of diverse programming.
54
With the recent development of other technologies and services for deliv-
ering video programming, cable television is no longer the only technol-
ogy on the horizon that is capable of providing such diversity.55 Because
of its compulsory license, cable enjoys a significant advantage over these
emerging technologies. It has also been suggested that in the long run,
below-market royalty rates will induce copyright owners to restrict the
amount of their programming on free television.56 Nevertheless, the ba-
sic issue remains whether copyright owners are being adequately com-
pensated under the system of compulsory licensing. As CBN illustrates,
proving harm is problematic and often involves a protracted court battle.
52. Id.
53. CBN, 720 F.2d at 1318.
54. Hatfield & Garrett, supra note 11, at 468. At that time, most cable systems could
carry programming on no more than twenty channels. Copyright owners received further
protection through pervasive FCC regulations in force at that time which restricted the
number of signals that a cable system could import. Id. at 468 n. 124.
55. Id. at 471.
56. Id. at 474 n. 138. This would eventually result in a loss to those who cannot afford or
do not have access to cable.
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As the Tribunal defines its methodology and criteria with greater preci-
sion, the court will apply a stricter standard of review. It is not unlikely
that the expanding future of cable technology may render the compul-
sory license unnecessary as greater numbers of non-network cable sta-
tions enter into negotiations with copyright owners in the traditional
marketplace manner.
Nora Dwyer
B. Constitutional Law
1. Access Of The Hearing-Impaired To Television Programming
According to the Federal Communications Commission, there may
be as many as twenty million hearing impaired persons in this country,
who therefore require specialized television broadcasting.1 Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have rendered deci-
sions which will have a significant impact on the access these twenty
million people have to television.2 The ultimate consequence of these
decisions is that the vast majority of television programs will continue to
be broadcast without captions for the hearing impaired.
In Community Television of Southern California v. Gottfried,3 the
Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973' did not require
the FCC to renew a public television station's license application under
any different standard than that applied to a commercial licensee. Con-
comitantly, the Court held that it was within the FCC's authority to de-
cline to impose a greater obligation on a public licensee than on a
commercial licensee to provide special programming for the hearing
impaired.'
Eight months after the Supreme Court's decision in Gottfried, the
Ninth Circuit in Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Com-
munity Television of Southern California6 held that the Rehabilitation act
did not mandate federally funded programs to be produced or broadcast
with open rather than closed captioning. Moreover, the court declared
that federal agencies which supply television funding were under no con-
stitutional duty to take affirmative action in order to make programming
accessible to the hearing impaired.7
1. The Use of Telecasts to Inform and Alert Viewers with Impaired Hearing, 26
F.C.C.2d 917 (1970).
2. Community Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983); Greater L.A.
Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Community Television of S. Cal., 719 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3535 (1984).
3. 459 U.S. 498 (1983).
4. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, provides that: "No otherwise qualified
handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V.
1982).
5. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 512.
6. 719 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3535 (1984).
7. Id. at 1024.
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Gottfried originated in 1977 when Sue Gottfried, individually and on
behalf of the deaf and hearing impaired population, and the Greater Los
Angeles Council on Deafness filed a formal petition with the FCC. Gott-
fried's petition requested that the FCC deny the renewal of the broadcast
licenses belonging to seven commercial stations and one public station.'
Gottfried advanced two principal grounds for denial. First she
claimed that the licensees failed to discharge their obligation to ascertain
the problems, needs and interests of the deaf and hearing impaired popu-
lation within their service area.9 Second, she claimed that the licensees
violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Gottfried also charged
that the public station KCET had failed to provide enough programming
with special captioning.'° She further alleged that KCET had shown in-
difference to the needs of the deaf. This indifference was manifest in
KCET's failure to broadcast a captioned version of the ABC evening
news through most of its licensed term, and in its subsequent failure to
broadcast the captioned program during prime time.
In its defense, KCET argued that it had responded to the needs of
the deaf and hearing impaired by presenting more than 960 programs in
the prior three years, which were either capitioned or signed, or included
no spoken words whatsoever." KCET maintained that all of these pro-
grams were understandable to the deaf and hearing impaired.
The FCC denied Gottfried's petition, concluding that the licensees'
efforts to ascertain the special needs of the hearing impaired were ade-
quate given that the FCC only required specialized programming tech-
niques for the broadcasting of emergency information.' 2 The FCC held
8. The licensees involved were KABC-TV, American Broadcasting Co.; KCOP-TV,
KCOP Television, Inc.; KHO-TV, RKO General, Inc.; KNBC-TV, National Broadcasting
Co.; KNXT-TV, Columbia Broadcasting System; KTLA-TV, Golden West Broadcasters; and
KTTV-TV, Metromedia, Inc. The eighth station is a noncommercial public station, KCET-
TV, licensed to Community Television of Southern California. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d
297, 300 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
9. Section 307(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)
(1983 Supp.) provides, in part, that: "the FCC is directed by statute to grant an application for
renewal of a broadcast license if it finds that the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity
would be served thereby.' "
10. Captioning refers to any of several technologies that project written text onto a televi-
sion image so that deaf viewers receive information that is communicated to others by the
soundtrack. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 501 n.3. See also, Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F.C.C.2d 378
(1976).
11. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 501, 502 n.4. These programs include: "Nova," "Once Upon a
Classic," and "Masterpiece Theatre."
12. Id. at 504, 505. See also License Renewal Applications of Certain Television Stations
Licensed for and Serving Los Angeles, Cal., 69 F.C.C.2d 451, 455 n.6 (1979) (wherein FCC
found licensee not required to include demographic data regarding its hearing impaired popu-
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that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to the seven
commercial stations because they were not alleged to have received any
federal funding.13
Gottfried appealed the FCC ruling to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. 1 4 The court affirmed that portion of the FCC's order relating to the
commercial stations, but vacated the renewal of KCET's license and re-
manded for further proceedings. 5 The court concluded that Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act did impose a legal obligation on KCET as a
federal funding recipient to comply with the Act's non-discrimination
requirement. Furthermore, the court held that the FCC must consider a
public station's adherence to the non-discrimination requirement in de-
termining whether the station had met the public interest standard, pur-
suant to Section 307 of the Communications Act. 6 Consequently, both
the FCC and KCET petitioned for certiorari.'
7
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Gottfried's objection
to the renewal of the commercial licensees, but reversed the court of ap-
peal holding insofar as it pertained to the FCC and to public broadcast-
ers. 8 In reversing, the Court relied upon the legislative history of the
Rehabilitation Act.
According to the Court, Congress, in amending the Act in 1978,
made explicit the earlier presumption that the FCC had no enforcement
obligation under Section 504.'9 As the Court observed, "[i]f such an en-
lation on renewal application, but only required to maintain a public file listing demographic
aspects of the community).
13. 459 U.S. at 505. In a second memorandum opinion and order, the FCC denied Gott-
fried's petition for reconsideration, stating that the allegations against KCET were premature
unless an authorized agency had determined that the station had violated Section 504. Fur-
ther, the FCC rejected Gottfried's additional argument that the FCC had a duty to adopt
regulations to implement Section 504. Petition for Reconsideration of Comm. Action, 72
F.C.C.2d 273, 279 (1979).
14. Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
15. Id. at 316. As to commercial stations, the court stated that although a license to
broadcast is a valuable commodity, it does not qualify as "financial assistance" within the
meaning of Section 504. Id. at 312. Thus, one who is merely a licensee is not a federal fund
recipient.
16. Id. at 307. Section 307 of the Communications Act of 1934 is codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 307 (West Supp. 1983). Note that this public interest standard has been construed
so as to include a requirement that broadcasters endeavor to discover and meet the program-
ming needs of all significant groups within their service areas. Stone v. F.C.C., 466 F.2d 316,
327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, 53 F.C.C.2d 3 (1975).
17. Gottfried v. United States, 454 U.S. 1141 (1984).
18. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 512.
19. Id. at 509. See Pub. L. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (Supp. V. 1982)).
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forcement obligation existed, it would have to derive from the Rehabilita-
tion Act itself, since the general words 'public interest' in the
Communications Act are not sufficient to create it."' 20 Thus, the respon-
sibility for enforcing the Act, insofar as it regulates private recipients of
federal funds, remains with those agencies administering the federal fi-
nancial assistance programs and the FCC is obviously not such an
agency. 21 The Court further stated that although
the FCC has an administrative duty to consider the needs of
handicapped citizens in determining whether a license renewal
would effectuate the policies behind the Communications Act
. . . but is by no means required to measure proposals for a
public television license renewal by the standards of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.
2
The Court then determined that, rather than the FCC, it was the Depart-
ment of Justice which had the authority to coordinate and implement the
enforcement of Section 504.23
Despite its finding that section 504 was not an absolute standard by
which renewal applications would be evaluated, the Court did concede
that if a licensee was found guilty of violating the Rehabilitation Act, the
FCC would clearly be obligated to consider its possible relevance in as-
certaining whether to renew the violator's license. 24 However, this con-
cession resulted in a hollow victory for the hearing impaired in that the
Court maintained that the FCC was not required to take original juris-
diction over such a controversy.25
Furthermore, while the Court recognized that a public station had a
duty to comply with the Rehabilitation Act, the Court nonetheless held
that the FCC was not required to evaluate a public station's service to the
handicapped community by a more stringent standard than that applica-
ble to a commercial station.26 The Court reasoned that the interest in
having both commercial and public stations serve the handicapped com-
munity is equally strong,27 thus suggesting that public stations are justi-
20. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 509 n.14; Cf. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 n.7 (1976).
Under the Communications Act, the FCC is charged with ensuring that its licensees' program-
ming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups. NAACP at 670 n.7.
21. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 509-10.
22. Id. at 509 n. 14.
23. Id. at 509-10 n. 15. In 1980, the coordination and enforcement of authority was trans-
ferred from HEW to the Department of Justice. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981).
24. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 510. For an explanation of FCC policy regarding regulatee vio-
lation of a federal statute, see Revision FCC Form 303, 59 F.C.C.2d 750, 763 (1951).
25. Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 510.
26. Id. at 511.
27. Id.
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fled in discriminating against the hearing impaired to an extent equal to
that of their commercial counterparts.
In concluding, the Court noted that whether a standard is being set
for the relicensing of a public or commercial station, rulemaking is gener-
ally a "better, fairer, and more effective" method of implementing an
industry-wide policy, than is the uneven application of contract condi-
tions.28 In any case, a decision regarding the manner in which such stan-
dards are applied would remain within the province of the federal agency
providing the funds. Thus, if a federal agency took it upon itself to im-
pose more rigorous standards on a public station, agency discretion
would determine whether conditions should be attached to the station's
subsidy or, alternatively, whether the agency should develop its own
standards under the Rehabilitation Act.29
Just eight months after Gottfried was decided, the Ninth Circuit in
Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Community Television of S.
Cal.30 was presented with several issues closely related to those decided
by the Supreme Court in Gottfried. The position taken by the Ninth
Circuit on these issues essentially mirrors that of the Supreme Court.
This is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's announcement that the govern-
ment was under no constitutional obligation to take affirmative action to
make television accessible for the hearing impaired. 31
In.addition to this holding, the court made a number of other pro-
nouncements regarding the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act. In
construing the Act, the court held that: (1) federally funded programs
are not required to have open, rather than closed, captions; (2) the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare is not required to terminate
funding of programs, pending the promulgation of regulations under Sec-
tion 504; (3) neither the FCC nor the Attorney General are required to
promulgate regulations under Section 504; and (4) it is within the discre-
tion of the Department of Education to determine whether to promulgate
regulations under Section 504 or proceed through adjudication and the
conditioning of grants in implementing its enforcement duties. 32
28. Id.
29. Id. at 511-12. The FCC argued that in the event such a "differential standard were
appropriate, commercial stations would be better able to afford the costs associated with spe-
cial programming than public television stations, which cannot sell advertising and which
serve the public in large part by airing programs of specialized interest that lack the mass
appeal required for broadcast on network affiliates." Id. at 512 n.19.
30. 719 F.2d 1017 (1983).
31. Id. at 1024.
32. Id. at 1021-23. The court also held that a private civil court action may be filed before
the administrative remedies provided in the Rehabilitation Act are exhausted. Id. at 1021.
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The action was initially brought in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California by the Greater Los Angeles Coun-
cil on Deafness and two individual plaintiffs, Marcella Meyer and Sue
Gottfried.33 Alleging in their complaint that Section 504 mandates fed-
erally funded stations to provide open captioning 34 of television pro-
grams, Meyer and Gottfried named two sets of defendants. The first
group, referred to as private defendants, included KCET, its officers, the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting
System (PBS). The complaint sought to enjoin KCET's broadcasting of
non-captioned programs and CPB's and PBS's distribution of funds and
programs to all stations broadcasting non-captioned programs.35
The second group, designated as federal defendants, included the
FCC, HEW, the Department of Education and the Attorney General.36
Meyer and Gottfried sought the termination of federal funding to these
grantees not in compliance with Section 504, as well as the recovery of
funds previously distributed to non-complying stations and the promul-
gation of regulations requiring public broadcasters to comply with the
Rehabilitation Act.37
The district court found that KCET, CPB, and PBS had not vio-
lated Section 504, concluding that it did not require them to take affirma-
tive action to provide access to television programming. However,
judgment was entered in favor of Meyer and Gottfried against the federal
defendants.
The court explained that insofar as the federal defendants had failed
to promulgate regulations implementing Section 504, it had effectively
discriminated against hearing impaired viewers by denying them the ben-
efit of federally funded programs.3" The court concluded that closed
33. The suit was certified as a class action on behalf of all hearing impaired persons within
Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, and San Bernardino Counties. Id. at 1019. However, the
Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness was dismissed for lack of standing. The order has
not been appealed. Id. at 1019 n.3.
34. Open captioning refers to subtitles appearing at the bottom of the television screen
which translates the audio portion of the program. Closed captioning requires the use of a
decoder which allows only those viewers with special equipment to view the audio translation.
Id. at 1019. This decoding equipment must be purchased by the viewer at an approximate cost
of $250. Id. at n.2. Although the cost of producing closed or open captioned programs is
equal; however, broadcasters may incur additional equipment expenses with open captioned
programs. Id. at 1019 n.2.
35. Id. at 1020.
36. Id. Originally the federal defendants comprised the FCC and HEW, but when HEW
was restructured in 1980, the Dept. of Education and the Attorney General were added as
defendants.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1021.
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capitioning was not a reasonable means of assuring non-discriminatory
access to television programs because only viewers with decoders would
be able to view the audio translation at the bottom of their television
screens. 
39
Accordingly, the district court enjoined the Department of Educa-
tion from allocating any funds for programming until it promulgated reg-
ulations consistent with the court's holding."° The Department was also
directed to continue with any of its attempted rule-making efforts in en-
forcing the Rehabilitation Act. Moreover, the FCC and the Attorney
General were ordered to issue standards in conformance with Section
504.
All parties appealed the district court's ruling.41 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment as it affected KCET, CPB and PBS, but reversed
the decision against the federal defendants.
In affirming the lower court's disposition of the claims against
KCET, CPB and PBS, the Ninth Circuit relied on the decision in South-
eastern Community College v. Davis,4 2 the first case in which the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret Section 504. Citing the unanimous
opinion in Davis, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[s]ection 504 by its own
terms does not compel [federally funded programs] . . . to make sub-
stantial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons to par-
ticipate."' 43  Instead, the Rehabilitation Act simply mandates the
"evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons," and not "af-
firmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps."'
In considering the significance of the term "evenhanded treatment,"
the Community Television court acknowledged that some sort of affirma-
tive modification of normal television broadcasting was required in order
to compensate the deaf and hearing impaired viewers' inability to receive
the audio portion of a broadcast.45 Nevertheless, in applying the Davis
analysis, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
that KCET, CPB and PBS did not have to take affirmative action on
39. Id. at 1019, 1021.
40. Id. at 1021. The disbursement of funds for projects developing or employing open
captioning was exempted.
41. Id. The federal defendants appealed the order that they promulgate regulations and
terminate funding. The plaintiff class cross-appealed the judgment dismissing the private de-
fendants. Additionally, the private defendants filed a protective appeal to challenge their loss
of funding. Id.
42. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
43. 719 F.2d at 1023.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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behalf of the hearing impaired, pursuant to Section 504, by captioning or
signing all its broadcasts. 46  The Ninth Circuit panel explained that
KCET's practice of broadcasting those programs already produced with
closed captions was a sufficient form of "affirmative modification of nor-
mal television."
47
Turning to the federal defendants, the court found no merit in
Meyer's and Gottfried's constitutional claims. The court dispensed with
their allegations by stating that there was no legal precedent to support
their contention that the first and fifth amendments imposed a duty of
affirmative action on the federal defendants to make television accessible
to the hearing impaired.48
In reversing the district court order mandating the termination of
funding pending the promulgation of Section 504 regulations by the De-
partment of Education and HEW, the Ninth Circuit asserted that with-
holding of funds is a " 'severe' remedy that an agency can invoke 'to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory prac-
tices.' ,,49 This proposition follows from a statutory procedure which al-
lows a federal agency to terminate funding only when an express finding
has been made that the funding recipient has failed to comply with a
funding requirement.5 ° The court held that there was no evidence to
support such a conclusion in this case, in light of a determination that the
funding recipients (KCET, CPB and PBS) had not violated any subsidy
requirements.5
Assessing the claims made against the Attorney General and the
FCC, the court declared that neither defendant had a duty to develop
regulations in accordinace with Section 504.52 The court noted that de-
spite the Attorney General's responsibility to coordinate the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the non-discrimination provision of Section
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1024.
49. Id. at 1021-22 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979)).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan or contract . . .
[may effect compliance] with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section...
by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such pro-
gram or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement. ...
51. 719 F.2d at 1022. The court also noted that there is nothing in the statute to indicate
that a private plaintiff may avail itself of this remedy. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441
U.S. at 704-06 (contrasting public and private remedies).
52. 719 F.2d at 1022.
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504,53 this responsibility did not entail the promulgation of regulations.54
Concomitantly, the court proclaimed that the district court order, requir-
ing the FCC to promulgate regulations, was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Gottfried.55 The Ninth Circuit reiterated
the Supreme Court's holding that since the FCC did not administer
funds, it therefore had no duty to promulgate regulations.56
Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Department of Edu-
cation was entitled to implement its enforcement duties under Section
504 by methods other than rulemaking.57 Thus, as the Supreme Court
had also concluded, it was up to the Department's discretion whether to
promulgate regulations or to proceed by adjudication and contract condi-
tions. 58 As the court suggested, from a practical standpoint, the use of
the latter methods might permit federal agencies to remain responsive to
developing technology.59
The court's suggestion was based on the assumption that such meth-
ods would allow the government to work with producers and broadcast-
ers in creating programs accessible to the hearing impaired. Such an
assumption, however, overlooks the possibility of the selective applica-
tion of contract conditions according to government caprice. This possi-
bility would necessarily be precluded if regulations were used to enforce
the Rehabilitation Act (especially since its application to broadcasting
has been severely limited, thereby making its requirements easier to ig-
nore) since a uniform, industry-wide standard would have to be
instituted.
Both Gottfried and Community Television present difficult questions
concerning the obligations of broadcasters and federal agencies in their
attempts to accommodate the special needs of hearing impaired viewers.
In their efforts to respond to the issues raised, both the Supreme Court
and the Ninth Circuit have clearly enunicated at least two points.
First, despite judicial recognition that the non-discrimination re-
53. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 app. at
23 (1982).
54. 719 F.2d at 1022 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.4 (1983)).
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Gottfried, 459 U.S. at 509. This holding was also affirmed in Cal. Assoc.
for Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 721 667 (9th Cir. 1983).
57. 719 F.2d at 1023. During the early stages of this litigation, the newly organized De-
partment of Education published a Notice of Intent to promulgate regulations. In 1981, how-
ever, it abandoned its rulemaking efforts and advised the court that it would proceed instead
by adjudication and imposition of contract conditions. Id. at 1020.
58. Id. at 1022 (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aero-Space Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)).
59. Id. at 1023. The court of appeal also emphasized the Supreme Court's decision in
Community Television that "the Government must proceed by rulemaking." Id.
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quirements of the Rehabilitation Act do apply to public television sta-
tions, public broadcasters effectively have no more of an affirmative duty
to avoid programming discrimination than do their commercial counter-
parts. Although the language of the Act clearly states that no handi-
capped individual shall be denied the benefits of any program receiving
federal financial assistance solely because of a handicap, under these two
decisions, the deaf viewer is being denied the benefits of public television
by virtue of his or her handicap. Furthermore, even though public
broadcasters are directed to make some type of affirmative modifications
in their normal broadcasts to accommodate their hearing impaired view-
ers, this minimum requirement may often remain unmet, since federal
agencies are not required to promulgate and enforce non-discriminatory
regulations.
Second, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's suggestion that the
FCC should take into account a public broadcaster's violation of the Re-
habilitation Act when considering its license renewal application, it is
evident that such a violation can and will be ignored according to FCC
discretion. This capacity for discretionary decision-making is eminently
consistent with the FCC's traditional view that its statutory duty to serve
the public interest is best fulfilled by "achieving diversity in entertain-
ment programming through market forces."' It is not, however, consis-
tent with the FCC's additional obligation to serve "public convenience
and necessity," at least insofar as the hearing impaired public is
concerned.
Melissa N. Widdifield
60. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 599 (1981).
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2. Miami Ordinance Regulating Cable Television Transmission Of
"Indecent" Material: The First Amendment To The Rescue
Adult movie lovers everywhere can breathe a heavy sigh of relief,
after a United States District Court decision found Miami City Ordi-
nance No. 9583, an ordinance designed to regulate indecent material on
cable television, unconstitutional. The court in Cruz v. Ferre granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined
the City of Miami, Florida from enforcing the indecency ordinance. 2
Ruben Cruz, a cable television subscriber, sued the City of Miami
on the grounds that the indecency ordinance violated his first amend-
ment right to free speech and his fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection rights.3
Subsequent to the filing of Cruz' lawsuit, Home Box Office, Inc. in-
tervened as a plaintiff, also alleging that the indecency ordinance re-
stricted free speech and infringed upon due process and equal
protection.4 HBO was a private cable television service offered to Miami
citizens who subscribed to Cablevision, the sole Miami cable television
licensee.5 About 75% of all Miami cable television receivers subscribed
to HBO.6
HBO's programming included feature films rated "G," "PG," or
"R," by the Motion Picture Association of America, but it was HBO's
policy not to show "X" rated films or their equivalent.7 Still, due to the
mature themes of many HBO presentations, the company provided safe-
guards for unwary viewers, including a monthly guide, extensively
describing its program offerings, as well as "lockboxes" and "parental
keys" provided free of charge by HBO.8
Despite these protective devices, the City of Miami chose further to
protect its viewers from "indecent" programs by enacting an "indecency
ordinance" banning the knowing distribution of indecent material over
cable television.9 The ordinance further provided that the City Manager
1. 571 F. Supp; 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
2. Id. at 127.
3. Id. at 126.
4. Id. at 128.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id. "Lockboxes" are devices attached to the television set, preventing access to pro-
gramming without unlocking the device with a "parental key."
9. Id. at 127. Miami City Ordinance No. 9583 states, "Section 1. No person shall by
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resolve any disputes arising over "probable cause," preside over any
hearing, and ultimately make any final judgment upon any complaint
filed pursuant to this ordinance. 1°
The court addressed the procedural hurdles of "case or contro-
versy" " and standing,' 2 prior to addressing the merits of the case. First,
the court found that the plaintiffs each had a ripe dispute against the City
of Miami. 3 A dispute is ripe when there is a "'substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.' "'4 While
the challenged ordinance had not yet been enforced, this was not mate-
rial as to the claim's "ripeness.""
Rather, the threat of enforcement of the ordinance and the likely
inhibition of the exercise of free speech were the relevant factors.' 6 The
threat of sanctions can deter the exercise of free speech as strongly as the
actual application of sanctions. '
7
The threat of enforcement of the indecency ordinance burdened the
right of cable television viewers to receive, and the right of cable televi-
sion operators to disseminate, diversified communications.' 8  These
threats, therefore, created a genuine "case or controversy" as to both
plaintiffs. '9
Once the controversy was established, plaintiffs had to show that
they were personally injured by the existing indecency ordinance.20 The
court admitted that the plaintiffs' injuries were not readily apparent, but
recognized that the chilling effect of the indecency ordinance on the exer-
cise of their free speech rights was quite real.2 '
Such anticipatory challenges are permissible when " 'the allegedly
means of a cable television system knowingly distribute by wire or cable any obscene or inde-
cent material."
10. Id.
11. Id. at 128.
12. Id. at 129.
13. Id. at 128-29.
14. Id. at 128, quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941).
15. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 128. See High o Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 621 F.2d 135, 139 (5th
Cir. 1980); American Booksellers Ass'n v. McAuliffe, 533 F. Supp. 50, 54-55 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
16. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 128.
17. Id. at 129, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
18. Id. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see also Home Box Office v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 988
(1977).
19. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 129.
20. Id. See Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
21. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 129.
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unconstitutional statute interferes with the way the plaintiff would nor-
mally conduct his affairs.' "22 Plaintiff-subscriber Cruz might have for-
saken his right to receive, rather than wage a costly battle against the
City.23 Likewise, the ordinance might have discouraged plaintiff-distrib-
utor HBO from pursuing programs that might have been found "inde-
cent" under the ordinance.24 When restraints on free speech are at issue,
the concept of standing is construed broadly by the courts in favor of
litigants asserting their free speech rights.25 The Cruz court found the
discouraging effects of the indecency ordinance substantial enough to
provide the plaintiffs with standing to bring suit against the City of
Miami.26
The discussion of the merits began with the ordinance's effect on
first amendment free speech.27 The court reiterated that the freedom to
speak has been among the most important and, therefore, most protected
of all constitutional rights, but that "[o]bscenity is unprotected because
of its minimal social value and offensiveness to contemporary moral stan-
dards."2 While obscenity is unprotected speech, the Supreme Court has
provided some first amendment protection for "indecent" speech.29 The
Cruz court found that the indecency ordinance regulated constitutionally
protected speech and was, therefore, unconstitutionally overbroad and
facially defective.3°
The Supreme Court has held that indecent speech can be regulated
on broadcast radio and television due to the nature of their ability to
invade the privacy of the home.31 Yet, the courts, as in Cruz, seem un-
22. Id, quoting International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th
Cir. 1979).
23. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 129.
24. Id., citing Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
25. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 129, citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973).
26. 571 F. Supp. at 129.
27. Id at 130.
28. Id. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
29. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
30. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 130-31.
31. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. The City's reliance on Pacifica was rejected by the court in
Cruz.
In Pacifica, a monologue by comedian George Carlin was aired on a radio station around
2 p.m. The monologue contained "offensive and vulgar language." The FCC found the mono-
logue to be "patently offensive - indecent, but not obscene - yet subject to regulation." The
Supreme Court agreed that this was a circumstance where indecent speech could be regulated.
The Court recognized that the content and context of speech are critical factors in deciding
whether the speech can be regulated. The Court noted that the pervasiveness of broadcast
radio (its ability to invade the home and the scarcity of available frequencies) limited its consti-
tutional protection. The Court also provided a host of variables which must be considered
before regulation of speech is permitted. These variables are time of day, program context, and
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willing to allow any regulation of indecent material on cable television,
due to cable's vast inherent differences from broadcast television.32
The dissimilarities between cable television and broadcast television
were discussed in a case involving identical circumstances, Community
Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City.33 The Roy City court struck down an
indecency ordinance because of cable television's adequate safeguards
against undesired and surprise viewing.34 Among the adequate safe-
guards perceived by the court was cable television's larger offering of
stations and the fact that television owners are free to accept or reject the
terms of cable programmers.35 Also, detailed monthly guides, in addi-
tion to "lockboxes" and "parental keys," were found sufficient to prevent
surprise viewing.36 The Cruz court applied this same reasoning and
found that the Miami indecency ordinance unconstitutionally abridged
protected speech.37
The court also found that the indecency ordinance violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3" The due process clause
was designed to protect against "arbitrary and capricious governmental
action."39 Due process safeguards apply when a property interest, such
as Cablevision's license, defined by a source such as state law, is subject
to deprivation.' In Cruz, the indecency ordinance provided for the City
Manager to be the primary decision maker through all stages of any dis-
pute involving potential indecency ordinance violations.4 ' Since due pro-
cess requires fair hearings, the court found that the power given solely to
the City Manager created an intolerably high risk of arbitrary or capri-
cious governmental action.42
While not ruling on the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the court,
nevertheless, discussed it in some detail.43 This claim involved the ques-
tion of whether the regulation of indecent speech on cable television, but
not of other communication forms, deprived cable programmers of equal
the inherent differences between radio, television and circuit transmission. For a more detailed
list of these differences, see Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 132.
32. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. 132.
33. 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 132.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 133.
39. Id. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
40. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 133. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1971).
41. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 133.
42. Id.
43. Id at 133-34.
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protection under the law."
The court was compelled to use a strict scrutiny standard of analysis
since the ordinance regulated speech content.4" Strict scrutiny required
the showing of a compelling state interest justifying the government ordi-
nance and the lack of a less restrictive alternative.4" The court found that
the City could not meet its burden of proving that indecent speech
presented on cable television has a greater effect on public morality than
indecent speech presented by other communication forms not regulated
by Miami's indecency ordinance.47 This disparity could not be justified
under the exacting demands of strict scrutiny; thus the indecency ordi-
nance denied plaintiffs equal protection under the law.4"
Although not discussed in much detail, Cruz raises a controversial
issue involving the extent to which first amendment rights are extended
to persons being denied the right to receive information. The Cruz court
concluded, without any analysis, that plaintiff-subscriber Cruz had his
first amendment free speech violated by the indecency ordinance's chil-
ling effect upon his "right to receive." 49 While the court's conclusion
may be correct, the question certainly is important enough to warrant
some discussion. An incorrect conclusion regarding a subscriber's first
amendment right to receive indecent material could mean the difference
between a plaintiff's summary judgment or a successful motion to dismiss
for lack of standing.
It seems that the current Supreme Court's position regarding stand-
ing in the first amendment area would be to acknowledge its existence in
the Cruz case. It has been established that "[f]reedom of speech presup-
poses a willing speaker", and where a speaker exists, "the protection is
afforded to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."
50
In short, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a first amendment right
to "receive information and ideas."'" Since the Cruz court concluded
that indecent speech on cable television is constitutionally protected, the
denial of Cruz' right to receive this indecent speech caused him sufficient
injury to provide standing.52
44. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 134.
45. Id. Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of scrutiny a court can apply.
46. Id. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
47. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 134.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 128-29.
50. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976).
51. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
52. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 128-29.
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This liberal interpretation of the first amendment free speech doc-
trine gained its widespread acceptance in the 1960's and early 1970's. 53
Because the complexion of the Supreme Court may take a very conserva-
tive turn in the next four years, the implied first amendment "right to
receive" could soon be narrowed. In a major case establishing this "right
to receive," Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., a dissenting Justice Rehnquist believed the court
should try to balance the interests "in individual free speech against the
public welfare determinations embodied in a legislative enactment." 55
Justice Rehnquist further stated that "[ljegitimate attempts to protect the
public, not from the remote possible effects of noxious ideologies, but
from the present excesses of direct, active conduct, are not presumptively
bad because they interfere with and, in some of its manifestations, re-
strain the exercise of first amendment rights."56 Using this analysis, the
potentially "conservative" new Supreme Court may not find standing in
a case similar to Cruz after applying Rehnquist's balancing test and
might conclude that an indecency ordinance is a legitimate attempt to
protect the public from the direct acts of "indecent" film programmers.
Thus, absent the "right to receive," a plaintiff-subscriber would not be
injured, and, consequently, would have no standing to sue.
Dicta in Cruz and Roy City strengthen the bedrock of first amend-
ment free speech. Both courts expressed a personal distaste for the inde-
cent material being subjected to regulation. 57 However, in the area of
free speech, public tolerance is required of the courts, not public ap-
proval.5" Freedom of speech should be most vigorously protected when
there exists, also, a freedom to choose.59 A cable subscriber has the op-
tion of whether to subscribe and has a myriad of choices as to what he or
she will watch. "If the first amendment means anything, it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house what
53. See Red Lion Brdcst'g Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. Id. at 789. Va Board involved plaintiff consumers' wanting to strike down a statute
prohibiting pharmacists from advertising drugs. The Court concluded the right to receive
drug information was constitutionally protected under the first amendment.
56. Id.
57. Cruz, 571 F. Supp. at 134-35. In Cruz, Judge Hoeveler states, "The butchers of our
times press forward, their appetites for profit obscured by the banners of the First Amendment
which they thrust forward with each new attempt to enlarge the ambit and prurience of their
offerings." 371 F. Supp. at 134.
58. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1172.
59. Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 991, 1001 (D. Utah 1982).
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books he may read or what films he may watch."'  The indecency ordi-
nance in Cruz clearly infringed this highly protected freedom of choice
and was correctly struck down on first amendment grounds.
Cruz should prove a significant financial victory for all cable pro-
grammers. Adult programming on cable television can prove to be a
very lucrative endeavor. Cable television advertising reveals that "adult"
programming is a selling point of many cable packagers. Cable compa-
nies often charge extra money to subscribers for the right to view adult
movies. This extra charge can provide considerable revenue for cable
companies. Naturally, legitimizing indecency ordinances would jeopard-
ize this adult market, resulting in substantial financial loss for cable com-
panies charging extra for access to adult entertainment programs.
It appears that Cruz and Roy City are founded on sound legal
grounds, and "indecency" ordinances such as these should become ex-
tinct. In Cruz, the court suggests that correction of the indecency ordi-
nance might be accomplished if the procedural language, regarding the
extreme power given to the City Manager, was eliminated. However, it
is becoming engrained in the law that indecent speech can be constitu-
tionally protected, and cable television, because of its adequate safe-
guards, is a proper medium for indecent speech. Consequently, the first
amendment substantive issues of free speech should obviate the need to
address the fourteenth amendment procedural issues.
Michael J. Grobaty
60. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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3. Evangelical Broadcasting: FCC Investigation Of Use Of
Donations Does Not Infringe First Amendment Rights
Television viewers often see television preachers soliciting contribu-
tions, but do they question whether these ministers are subject to allega-
tions of fraud when their donations are misappropriated? In Scott v.
Rosenberg,' the Ninth Circuit recently held that government employees
involved in an investigation of a church's television and radio stations
had not unjustifiably violated a television preacher's first amendment
rights.2
Reverend W. Eugene Scott, Ph.D., president and pastor of the Faith
Center Church,3 sought injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages
against employees of the Federal Communications Commission for an
alleged violation of his first amendment rights during their investigation
of the Church's television and radio stations.4 Paul Diederich, a former
employee of one of the Church's television stations, sent a letter to the
FCC; he alleged that Scott solicited funds for projects that were never
undertaken and that Scott was using the station for personal gain.5 As a
result, the FCC initiated an investigation and started conducting inter-
views. Further allegations were made that the Church's stations failed to
log paid religious programming as commercial broadcasting, that Scott
misstated the amounts of his personal remuneration during broadcast so-
licitations, and that Scott made personal pledges during broadcasts that
were never kept.6
FCC investigators subsequently made an unannounced visit to the
Church requesting certain station records; the Church relinquished some
but not all of the requested records.7 The FCC then gave notice of its
intent to hold a hearing to determine if the station's license renewal ap-
plication would be granted and whether the license was subject to "forfei-
ture for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343," which governs fraud through the
use of radio and television.8
Scott brought suit in federal district court to vindicate his individual
1. 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1439 (1984).
2. Id. at 1276.
3. Id. at 1266.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. See In re Application of Faith Center, Inc. Station KHOF-TV, 82 F.C.C.2d 1
(1980) (order dismissing Faith Center's application for license renewal sustained).
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
rights. He contested the FCC's inquiry into his personal donations,
claiming that his religion required that his donations be kept confidential
and that an investigation of them violated his free exercise rights under
the first amendment.9 The trial judge granted summary judgment for the
FCC employees."°
The appellate court first addressed the threshold issue of whether
the pastor had standing. The court held that the Constitution's article
three prerequisites11 and other prudential requirements 2 for standing
were satisfied. Having made this determination, the court turned to the
merits of Scott's claims.
The Attorney General of California initiated an investigation of the
Church that was similar to the FCC inquiry. 3 Scott alleged that FCC
employees participated in the state investigation' 4 and, thereby, violated
Title 42, Section 1983, of the United States Code,' 5 which provides a civil
action for the deprivation of rights by persons who act under color of
state law. The court found no material fact which would substantiate
Scott's claim.' 6
The court assumed that federal employees, like private individuals,
could act under color of state law in violation of Section 1983."7 The
court decided that the FCC employees did not instigate the state investi-
gation nor did they request that certain information be acquired on their
behalf by the state investigators. The court held that federal employees
sharing information with the state, even information obtained by the
state in violation of Scott's first amendment rights, was accomplished
under authority of federal law. This, without more, was not enough to
establish that the FCC employees acted under color of state law.'
Scott further alleged that government employees, ex-church offi-
9. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1266-67 (government employees did not dispute that Scott's religion
required donations be kept confidential).
10. Id. at 1266.
11. Id. at 1267. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1967).
12. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1267. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
13. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1269.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proceeding proper for redress. . ..
16. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1269.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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cials, and the California Attorney General conspired to deprive him of
his first amendment rights in violation of Section 1985(3).19 The pastor
failed to allege that the conspiracy had a class-based discriminatory ani-
mus, which is a requirement of this statutory cause of action.2" Since
Scott did not state facts sufficient to infer a class-based amimus, the court
concluded that he failed to state a claim for relief under the statute.2 '
The court next addressed Scott's damages claim for the alleged vio-
lation of his first amendment rights, and stated that damage remedies for
governmental actions should be statutorily mandated.22 However, there
are judicially created damage remedies for violations of the fourth, fifth,
and eighth amendments.23 The court enumerated various policy factors
to be used when considering whether damages are an appropriate remedy
for first amendment violations.24 The court, instead of deciding whether
damages were available to Scott, assumed they would be if the court
found that his first amendment rights had been unjustifiably violated.25
Scott also alleged that the "government employees dispatched
charges of fraud to the press and public" and that "those statements in-
terfered with the free exercise of his religious obligation to convert others
to his beliefs."' 26 The court stated that the government employees had
only confirmed that an investigation was in progress and that therefore
Scott's allegations were merely conclusory and unable to withstand the
motion for summary judgment.27
Scott next argued that the FCC investigation of his pledges violated
his constitutional free exercise rights. 28 The court's inquiry took two
paths: The court first examined the FCC action with respect to the
Church's television station and, second, analyzed the effect on Scott as an
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981) states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ...for the purpose of
depriving,. . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws...
the person so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
20. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1270, citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971).
21. Id. at 1270.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1271, citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979). The Scott court
listed factors to be considered: whether damages are a historically accepted remedy; whether
damages are judicially manageable; whether alternative remedies are available; whether a dam-
age remedy would be contrary to the intent of Congress; and whether the damages remedy
would open the floodgates of litigation.
25. Scott, F.2d at 1271.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1272.
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individual.29 The court stated that a lower standard of protection applies
to broadcast media under the first amendment.3" The FCC, with ap-
proval of the courts, issues licenses and applies its rules without differen-
tiating between secular and non-secular broadcasters.31 The court held
that the FCC did not have to justify the investigation into allegations of
fraud by a television station that was owned by a religious organization.32
But, the court noted that investigations of licensees by the FCC
could intrude on an individual's free exercise rights. An individual's
"free exercise rights can be protected by requiring the FCC to demon-
strate a compelling governmental interest."33 The court observed that
Scott's sincerely held religious beliefs, concerning the confidentiality of
his donations, were in conflict with the FCC's request for the Church's
records of donations.34 The court concluded that the FCC demand for
Church records interfered with Scott's first amendment rights, but stated
that an infringement on religious liberty is justifiable if it is necessary to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.35
Whether the governmental interest in preventing fraudulent prac-
tices is sufficiently compelling to justify the burden on Scott's constitu-
tional rights is a question of law. 36 The court stated, "[t]he governmental
interest in preventing some crimes is compelling. . ... ,3 The court
noted that religious frauds can be penalized and concluded that the "na-
ture of the fraud" determined whether the governmental interest out-
weighed Scott's individual rights of religious freedom.38
The FCC alleged that Scott solicited funds for specific projects that
were never undertaken.39 Scott stated that, according to his religion, the
donations, not their use, were important. It did not matter what the
funds were used for, as he followed "'the leanings of the Lord' " to de-
termine how to spend the solicited funds."° The court concluded that the
29. Id.
30. Id., citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
31. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1272, citing Federal Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1962);
Red Lion Brdcst'g v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
32. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1272.
33. Id. at 1273.
34. Id. The government employees did not challenge the sincerity of the pastor's religious
beliefs. Scott's beliefs were not " 'so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.'" Id., quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of
the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
35. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1273.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1274.
38. Id.
30. Id.
40. Id. at 1274-75.
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government had a compelling interest in preventing diversion of dona-
tions from the specific projects for which they were solicited.4
The court next considered whether the FCC investigation was nec-
essary to further the government's compelling interest.42 It noted that
Scott made his solicitations over public airwaves.4 3 Since broadcast
licenses are a public trust, the court held that the viewing public and the
obligation of government to protect the public are paramount to the
rights of broadcasters.'
The court questioned whether the information relied on by the FCC
in beginning its investigation of the Church was reliable.45 The FCC
received a signed complaint from Mr. Diederich, a person in a position to
have first hand knowledge of the alleged violations.46 Furthermore, the
FCC conducted additional interviews before it requested records from
the Church.47 The court, therefore, held that the FCC relied on informa-
tion that justified an investigation.48
A third inquiry concerned the scope of the FCC investigation.49 The
court stated that the investigation "was narrow and avoided any unnec-
essary interference with the free exercise of religion."5 The court stated
that the FCC objectives were accomplished by the least restrictive means
available and that the investigation was necessary to serve the compelling
governmental interest.5
Scott also claimed that the FCC employees violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment.5 2 He asserted that the request for
his records was the initial step in a government plan to regulate reli-
gion.53 The court stated that the government employees were merely in-
vestigating allegations of fraud and that Scott had "alleged no facts from
41. Id. at 1275.
42. Id.
43. Id. Allegations of fraud, even if not sufficiently specific or reliable generally to justify
investigations into solicitations made by a congregation while in church, may nevertheless be
sufficient to justify inquiries into broadcast solicitations.
44. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 912 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
45. Id. at 1275.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court stated that it could "imagine circumstances in which the interference
with religion could be substantial enough to overbalance a governmental interest that other-
wise would be compelling .. .
51. Id. at 1276.
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
53. Scott, 702 F.2d at 1276.
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which we can infer that pervasive regulation is either planned or
threatened. '5 4 Lastly, the court held that the FCC employees had not
"unjustifiably violated Scott's first amendment rights, and therefore [did]
not reach the question of immunity. ' "
The FCC may investigate broadcasters that it reasonably suspects
are in violation of FCC regulations. The investigation may take place
even if it interferes with the broadcaster's first amendment rights. This
investigatory power is not diminished by the fact that the broadcaster or
licensee has a religious affiliation or theme in its program.
When an investigation might infringe on first amendment rights, the
tips which instigate the investigation must be sufficiently trustworthy.
The investigation must be narrow and avoid unnecessary intrusions on
individual rights. Finally, the inquiry must be necessary to preserve a
compelling governmental interest.
It is noteworthy that the court assumed, without holding, that there
is a civil cause of action for violations of first amendment rights. The
Supreme Court has sanctioned civil damage remedies for violations of
the fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments. In absence of congressional
action, a judicially created civil damages remedy for violations of the first
amendment may be in the future.
Michael K. Wofford
54. Id.
55. Id.
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C. Broadcast Regulation
1. Sponsorship Identification: When Must A Broadcaster Disclose
Who Really Pays For Those Political Advertisements?
During the peak of any political year voters have the dubious plea-
sure of having their airwaves filled with advertisements for or against
various candidates, issues and parties. Generally, these advertisements
are accompanied by either an announcer's voice over or a small tag line
running beneath the advertisement stating, "Paid for by. . . ." Many
of these groups have such innocuous names as "Committee for Responsi-
ble Government" or "Committee Against Evil Government." Often,
these committees are mere shells for certain political groups seeking to
conceal their true identities from the voting public. In Loveday v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission,1 the District of Columbia Circuit
Court discussed the duty of a broadcaster to identify the sponsors of paid
political advertisements.
In 1980, California voters were called upon to decide an initiative
requiring separate smoking and no smoking areas in most enclosed busi-
nesses, public, health and educational places in California. A large
number of advertisements opposing this proposition were purchased
from radio and television broadcasters by a committee called Californi-
ans Against Regulatory Excess ("CARE").
In a letter sent to all of the radio and television broadcasters carry-
ing CARE's advertisements, a representative of the committee support-
ing the initiative, an associate of petitioner Loveday, identified the
tobacco industry as the sponsor of CARE's advertisements and as the
supplier of CARE's funding. The letter also stated that CARE had been
purchasing advertisements in excess of its stated resources and informed
the broadcasters that, four years earlier, the tobacco industry was almost
the sole financial source used to defeat a similar measure. The letter also
demanded that the broadcasters discover and disclose the fact that the
tobacco industry was sponsoring these advertisements, citing the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") sponsorship identification
requirements. 2
1. 707 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.) (per Bork, J.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 525
(1983).
2. The appropriate section of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 provides in part:
(c) The licensee of each radio station shall exercise reasonable diligence to ob-
tain from. . . persons with whom it deals directly in connection with any program
. . . information to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by this
section.
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None of the broadcasters responded to the committee's letter. A
second letter was sent reiterating the committee's position and threaten-
ing legal action if the broadcasters failed to identify the tobacco industry
as the sponsors of the advertisements.
After several broadcasters notified CARE of the committee's allega-
tions and requested a response, CARE sent the broadcasters a letter iden-
tifying CARE's purposes and organizational structure, as well as
CARE's campaign efforts to date. Although CARE acknowledged that
it had received contributions from some tobacco companies, it denied
being an agent of the tobacco industry. No broadcaster chose to stop
identifying CARE as the sponsor of the advertisements nor stopped air-
ing the advertisements.
Loveday and the committee in favor of the initiative then requested
a declaratory ruling from the FCC. Loveday alleged that the broadcast-
ers had failed to meet their sponsorship identification obligations because
the tobacco industry was not identified as the principal behind CARE
and its advertisements.' He additionally sought to require the broadcast-
ers to identify the tobacco industry as the sponsor of all future
advertisements.
Loveday presented extensive evidence to the FCC linking the to-
bacco industry to CARE.4 CARE, in response, described its efforts to
refute the allegations, as evidenced in its letters to the broadcasters. Con-
47 U.S.C. § 317(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
The appropriate regulation provides in pertinent part:
(a) When a broadcast station transmits any matter for which money . . . is
paid. . . the stations, at the time of the broadcast, shall announce (1) that such
matter is sponsored. . . and (2) by whom or on whose behalf such consideration was
supplied ....
(b) The licensee of each broadcast station shall exercise reasonable diligence to
obtain from. . . persons with whom it deals directly in connection with any matter
for broadcast, information to enable such licensee to make the announcement re-
quired by this section ...
(e) The announcement required by this section shall. . . fully and fairly dis-
close the true-identify of the person . . . committee . . . or other unincorporated
group. . . by whom or on whose behalf such payments is made or promised, or from
whom or on whose behalf such services or other valuable consideration is received
.... Where an agent. . . makes arrangements with a station on behalf of another,
and such fact is known or by the exercise of reasonable diligence, as specified in
paragraph (b) of this section, could be known to the station, the announcement shall
disclose the identity of the person. . . or entity on whose behalf such agent is acting
instead of the name of such agent.
47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1983).
3. Id.
4. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1446. The evidence consisted of a large variety of exhibits, in-
cluding articles and affidavits, designed to prove that the tobacco industry was the true sponsor
of the advertisements.
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sequently, the FCC delegated the hearing to the Broadcast Bureau.5
The Broadcast Bureau ("Bureau") found that the relevant issue was
whether the broadcasters failed to exercise reasonable due diligence in
identifying the sponsor of the CARE advertisements.6 The Bureau stated
that, although a broadcaster was obligated to make "a reasonably dili-
gent effort to identify the sponsor of broadcast material," the broadcaster
was not an insurer of the sponsor's representations.7 After reviewing
CARE's letters, the Bureau held that it was reasonable to identify the
advertisements' sponsor as CARE. Although the Bureau suggested that
it would have been equally reasonable to identify the tobacco industry as
the sponsors, it dismissed Loveday's petition.'
The FCC affirmed the Bureau's findings. 9 Loveday appealed to the
District of Columbia Circuit Court. The court narrowed the issue to
whether the broadcasters had an obligation to investigate the sponsorship
issue raised by Loveday. Therefore, it only considered the information
provided the broadcasters in the two letters sent to them by Loveday's
associate. ' It refused to consider Loveday's additional evidence because
it was found too irrelevant since the decision hinged on the issue of notice
to the broadcasters.
The crucial inquiry by the court was the interpretation of the Com-
munications Act and FCC regulations1" which require that a broadcast
licensee identify the sponsor of paid advertisements and that the licensee
"exercise reasonable diligence" to learn the identity of the sponsor.' 2
The court found that the FCC had interpreted this requirement as al-
lowing a broadcaster to accept the apparent sponsor's representations
that it was the real party in interest even though the broadcaster had
been confronted with undocumented allegations to the contrary.' 3 The
court held that, in keeping with the FCC's interpretations and in the
absence of documented evidence refuting CARE's representations, the
broadcasters had acted reasonably in accepting CARE's representations
concerning sponsorship of the advertisements. The court found that
5. Id. at 1447; In re Request for Declaratory Ruling of Paul Loveday and Californians
for Smoking and No Smoking Sections, 87 F.C.C.2d 492 (1981).
6. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1447. The Broadcast Bureau is operated as an arm of the FCC,
hearing certain complaints and reviewing certain matters on behalf of the FCC. See 47 C.F.R.
§§ 0.71, 0.281 (1980).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1448.
13. Id. at 1449.
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Loveday's associate had made general allegations but had failed to give
the broadcasters specific evidence to substantiate them.' 4 Had such evi-
dence been presented, arguably, the broadcasters would then be required
to make some kind of investigation regarding the sponsor's true
identity. 5
Much of the court's analysis relied heavily upon a lengthy review of
Section 317 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 ("Act"). 6 The
court traced the legislative history of Section 317 from its predecessor
statute, the Radio Act of 1927, ' 7 through Congress' statutory amend-
ments of the Act in 1960.18 The court also focused upon the FCC's inter-
pretations of the section through its administrative rulings.1 9
The court emphasized the failure of both Congress and the FCC to
place a stringent duty on broadcasters to investigate the representations
of advertisers as to who may be considered the true sponsor.21 Specifi-
cally, the court pointed to instances where Congress could have required
broadcasters to undertake independent investigations of potential spon-
sors but did not.2' Instead, the court noted, Congress required broad-
casters to identify principals only when they knew an agency relationship
existed between the agent soliciting the advertisement and an undisclosed
third party.
22
The court also reviewed the action taken by the FCC following Con-
gress' 1960 amendments but found that the FCC had chosen not to ex-
pand a broadcaster's duty to investigate.23
Since 1960, only two major actions have attempted to clarify spon-
sorship identification rules. In United States v. WHAS, Inc. ,24 an adver-
tising agency purchased air time to run a commentary disparaging the
governor of Kentucky. Initially, the agency told the broadcaster that the
commentary was paid for by a committee supporting an opponent to the
14. Id. at 1459.
15. Id. at 1449.
16. Id. at 1449-55.
17. The Radio Act of 1927, ch, 169, § 19, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927).
18. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1449-55. The court reviewed congressional action taken in 1927,
1934 and 1960.
19. Id. at 1455-57. The court focused upon United States v. WHAS, Inc., 385 F.2d 784
(6th Cir. 1967) and VOTER, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d 350 (1979). Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1456.
20. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1454.
21. Id. The court noted that Congress failed to ratify the FCC's opinion in Albuquerque
Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 1 (1946), where the FCC suggested that a broadcaster may have a
duty to investigate a sponsor if the circumstances might raise a reasonable suspicion that the
true sponsor had not been disclosed by the advertisement's purchaser.
22. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1454.
23. Id. at 1455-57.
24. 385 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1967).
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governor in the upcoming election. Other facts presented to the broad-
caster suggested that this was true. However, the agency later identified
the "Committee for Good Government" as the sponsor of the commen-
tary. The broadcaster listed this committee as the sponsor when the
commentary aired.
The FCC held that the broadcaster failed in its duty to identify the
principal as the governor's opponent, since its identity was known to the
broadcaster.25 The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court's findings
that the broadcaster had not violated its duty to identify the sponsor of
the program, held that the broadcaster has the right to identify the payor
of the advertisement under Section 317(d). This section provides that, in
the case of programs other than for commercial products which are paid
for by a committee, the broadcaster shall disclose the name of that
committee.26
The WHAS court stated that since the FCC, by its regulations or
otherwise, had not prohibited a broadcaster from interpreting this section
as WHAS had, WHAS was free to interpret its obligations in this man-
ner.27 However, the WHAS court noted, in dicta, that its opinion was in
no way intended to prohibit the FCC from promulgating a regulation
that would require a broadcaster "to make reasonable efforts to go be-
yond a named 'sponsor" for a political program in order to ascertain the
real party in interest for purposes of announcement. '2
As the Loveday court noted, the FCC responded to the decision in
WHAS in 1975 with an amendment to its regulations regarding a broad-
caster's duty to investigate. 29 The sponsorship identification rules were
amended to require a broadcaster to disclose the identity of the person or
entity on whose behalf an agent is acting instead of the agent's name if
that identity was known or, by the "exercise of due diligence," could be
known to the sponsor.3°
In its report and order regarding the 1975 amendment, the FCC
specifically stated that one of its intentions in promulgating the amend-
ment was to avoid the interpretation and result reached by the court in
WHAS.31 The report and order also stated that the amendment was in-
tended to emphasize "the duty of licensees to look beyond ostensible
25. Id. at 785.
26. Id. at 787; 47 U.S.C. § 317(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
27. 385 F.2d at 787.
28. Id. at 788.
29. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1456; 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1983).
30. In re Amendment of Commission's "Sponsorship Identification" Rules, 33 Rad. Reg.
2d 975 (1975).
31. Id. at 980.
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",32
sponsors ....
The only FCC case to interpret these amendments prior to Loveday,
as the Loveday court properly noted, is VOTER.33 In VOTER, certain
broadcasters ran advertisements paid for by a committee known as West-
chester Citizens Against Government Takeover ("Westchester") in op-
position to a referendum regarding utilities. VOTER, a committee in
favor of the referendum, filed a complaint against these broadcasters for
failing to identify Con Edison as the true sponsor of the advertisements.
VOTER alleged that Con Edison supplied Westchester with substantially
all their funds and that Westchester was acting as an agent for Con
Edison.
Westchester denied acting as Con Edison's agent although it did ac-
knowledge that it accepted "substantial financial contributions" from
Con Edison. Westchester also pointed out that, as a requirement of its
by-laws, it alone could exercise editorial control over the advertisements.
The FCC stated that the sole issue was whether any broadcaster
who failed to add or substitute Con Edison as the sponsor of the adver-
tisements violated its sponsorship identification requirements.3 4 It held
that, although a broadcaster could, based upon the facts provided, substi-
tute or add Con Edison as the sponsor of the advertisements, none of the
broadcasters failed to act reasonably when they merely listed Westches-
ter as the sponsor.35 The FCC's rationale was that, since Westchester
was required by its by-laws to exercise editorial control over the adver-
tisements, and since the broadcasters acted in good faith in accepting
Westchester's representations, their obligations had been met. 36
The Loveday court properly recognized the FCC's unwillingness in
VOTER to require the broadcasters to look beyond the representations of
the purported sponsor so long as the broadcaster relied upon the repre-
sentations in good faith. 37 While this appears to be a significant turn-
around on the part of the FCC from its position in WHAS, the Loveday
court was correct to recognize that such a turnaround had occurred.
Based solely on the present position of the FCC, and given the absence of
any congressional language requiring some kind of stringent duty to in-
vestigate, it appears that a broadcaster is under no duty to investigate the
purported sponsor of a political advertisement absent persuasive evidence
32. Id. at 985.
33. 46 Rad. Reg. 2d 350 (1979).
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1457.
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that the purported sponsor is acting merely as an agent for an undis-
closed principal.3 8
The Loveday court, in what can be clearly described as dicta, dis-
cussed its belief that, if the FCC ever desired to impose a more stringent
duty upon broadcasters, it might be prevented from doing so because of
first amendment considerations.3 9 "[W]here the law's attempt to dis-
cover the true utterers of political messages becomes so intrusive and
burdensome that it threatens to silence or make ineffective the speech in
question, the law presses into areas which the guarantee of free speech
makes at least problematic."'
If a more stringent duty were imposed by the FCC, the Loveday
decision would seem to require a clearer mandate from Congress before
the court would find such a duty constitutionally permissible.4 Unfortu-
nately, the court did not cite any precedent to support its belief that such
a duty would indeed raise any first amendment problems. In fact, much
of the court's discussion in this area was spent recognizing that the
Supreme Court has afforded the broadcast media with fewer speech and
press freedoms than it has afforded other forms of media.42 Although the
Loveday court may have raised the issue that will prove to be dispositive
in future sponsorship identification cases, it appears from its own discus-
sion that this argument may be nothing more than a tempest in a teapot.
Grant Marylander
38. Id. at 1459.
39. Id. at 1458-59. See U.S. Const., amend. I.
40. Loveday, 707 F.2d at 1459.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that in considering
the propriety of an FCC attempt to regulate 'indecent broadcasting', broadcasting has most
limited first amendment protections of all forms of communication).
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2. Fairness Doctrine: Forecast Is Foul Weather
Broadcasters: 1,000; fairness doctrine: one.' So far, the average
score tallied by the number of successful fairness doctrine complaints
against broadcasters suggests a grim future for the vitality of this require-
ment2 of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC").3 The fair-
ness doctrine imposes an affirmative duty on broadcasters to devote a
reasonable amount of their broadcast time to the discussion of issues of
public importance, and to cover those issues fairly by affording reason-
able opportunities for the presentation of opposing viewpoints.4 Since
broadcasters generally have maximum editorial discretion in determining
what constitutes "reasonable opportunity"5 , they tend to prevail in most
challenges to their judgment, as evidenced in Democratic National Com-
mittee v. Federal Communications Commission.6
In Democratic National Committee, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court agreed with the FCC's decision that the
broadcasters accused of a fairness doctrine violation were under no obli-
gation to respond to a complaint brought by the Democratic National
Committee ("D.N.C.").7 Despite an acute imbalance of time allotted to
each side of the issue,' the court held that the D.N.C. failed to ade-
quately show that the stations acted unreasonably in presenting counter-
1. "The average [fairness doctrine] complainant truly [has] only about one in a thousand
chance [of success]". Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 717
F.2d 1471, 1478 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
2. The fairness doctrine was developed by the FCC based on the public interest standard
of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (West 1976). In 1959, Congress
confirmed the FCC's views that the fairness doctrine was part of the public interest standard
and amended the "equal time" provision, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (West 1976), to provide that:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence [making certain programming exempt from the
equal time requirement] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries and on-the-
spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this
chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance [emphasis added].
See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974); Applicability of Fairness Doctrine in Handling
Controversial Issues of Public Importance (Fairness Primer), 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964).
3. The FCC is a seven-member commission responsible for regulating all interstate and
foreign communication by means of radio, television, wire, cable, and satellite. Broadcast sta-
tions are licensed by the FCC for a three-year period subject to renewal. CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, INC., FEDERAL REGULATORY DIRECTORY (1979-80).
4. See Red Lion Brodcst'g Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969).
5. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1476.
6. 717 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 1473.
8. Id. at 1474.
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balancing viewpoints regarding the Reagan Administration's economic
policies.9
In the fall of 1981, the Republican National Committee ("R.N.C.")
paid for a series of thirty-second spots on the Columbia Broadcasting
System ("CBS") and National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") net-
works in support of the Administration's economic plan."0 After com-
plaining to the broadcasters," the D.N.C. promptly filed a fairness
doctrine complaint with the FCC, seeking a ruling requiring NBC and
CBS to provide free time to the D.N.C. to present the other side of the
issue.' 2 The D.N.C. submitted the findings of two news monitoring serv-
ices as evidence of the unfairness of the programming. The findings con-
cluded that during a three-month period in the fall of 1981, the ratio of
time devoted to presenting both sides of the issue had been two to one in
favor of the Republicans on CBS, and two and one half to one favoring
the Administration's views on NBC.' 3 Considering the addition of ad-
vertisements bought by the R.N.C., the imbalance rose to over four to
one on NBC, and more than three to one on CBS.' 4
In spite of this seemingly obvious incongruity in time allotment, the
FCC found that the imbalance was "hardly . . . a glaring disparity,"' 5
and was insufficient to warrant its intervention or even further investiga-
tion.' 6 The FCC found that the D.N.C. failed to make a prima facie
showing' 7 that NBC's and CBS's overall programming had failed to pro-
vide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting view-
points. 8 Furthermore, because the D.N.C.'s showing of an imbalanced
time allotment did not, to the FCC's satisfaction, reflect such factors as
the size of the audience during the various broadcasts or the frequency
with which each side was presented, the FCC did not consider the evi-
9. Id. at 1473.
10. Id.
11. See Broadcast Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1975) (viewer who believes broad-
caster is not meeting its fairness doctrine obligations must first complain to the station).
12. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1473.
13. Id. at 1474.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1477.
16. Id.
17. In order to establish aprimafacie case, the complainant must submit information that,
in the absence of rebuttal, establishes a fairness doctrine violation. The complaint must indi-
cate: (1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature dis-
cussed over the air; (3) the date and time the program was carried; (4) the basis for the claim
that the station has presented only one side of the question; and (5) whether the station had
afforded, or has plans to afford, an opportunity for presenting contrasting viewpoints. Demo-
cratic, 717 F.2d at 1475-76 (quoting Fairness Primer, 40 F.C.C. at 600).
18. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1473.
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dence sufficient for a determination that "fairness had not been
achieved." 19
The Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC's decision.20 The court
wholeheartedly supported the "formidable procedural barrier" that the
FCC erects by requiring a complainant to present prima facie evidence of
a fairness doctrine violation before it will request a response from the
offending broadcaster.2 Instead of opting to facilitate debate before the
Commission, the court preferred the FCC's stringent screening process
designed to encourage "robust, wide-open debate"22 over the airwaves.
In reality, the ideal of "wide-open debate" is mitigated by allowing
broadcasters "maximum editorial discretion in deciding how to fulfill
fairness doctrine obligations.
23
The standard the broadcaster must meet in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of the fairness doctrine is unclear. The court stated the stan-
dard is certainly not one of "mathematical equality."' 24 The criterion is
"that the American public must not be left uninformed. ' 2' The court
reasoned that this standard must take into account not simply the
amount of time given to each side of an issue, but a combination of fac-
tors suggesting a lack of fairness, including frequency of presentation and
audience size.26
The court agreed with the FCC's findings that these various factors
had not been addressed by the D.N.C. in its complaint.2 7 In the court's
view, the D.N.C.'s complaint had overemphasized the disparity of time
allotment and the ensuing quantitative "imbalance., 28 The court favored
a qualitative standard,29 governed by the broadcaster's "good faith and
19. Id. at 1476.
20. Id. at 1477.
21. Id. at 1475. See Nat'l Comm. for Responsive Philanthropy v. FCC, 652 F.2d 189, 191
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (no fairness doctrine violation where networks refused to present contrasting
views to advertisements for the United Way).
22. Id. at 1477 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
23. Id. at 1476 (quoting American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 445
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
24. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1477 (quoting Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 16 (1974)).
25. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
26. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1476 (citing Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 17).
27. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1477-78.
28. Id. at 1478.
29. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1972): "[Iln opin-
ion after opinion, the Commission and the courts have stressed the wide degree of discretion
available under the fairness doctrine and we have clearly stated time after time, ad infinitum
ad nauseum, that the key to the doctrine is no mystical formula but rather the exercise of
reasonable standards by the licensee." See also Green, 447 F.2d at 328: "[U]nder the fairness
doctrine identical treatment of both sides of the issue is not necessary, as this would place an
onerous and impractical burden on the licensees."
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reasonableness," 3 and rejected what it considered to be D.N.C.'s at-
tempt to impose an equal time standard.3" The court was also concerned
with the probability that requiring equality with respect to broadcasting
political and social issues would involve the FCC "too deeply in broad-
cast journalism,"32 and would require the Commission to take an active
part in the policing of the electronic media.33 Apparently, the FCC had
no desire to play such a role, and the D.C. Circuit displayed no intention
to encourage such intervention.34
In the interests of broadcasters' freedom of speech and exercise of
discretion, the court also summarily rejected the D.N.C.'s contention
that fairness doctrine obligations could not have been met by balancing
the R.N.C.'s high-impact commercial advertising with the comparatively
low-key presentation of opposing views on news programs. 35 Broadcast-
ers have the option of offsetting commercial messages by other modes of
presentation in their overall programming.36 Both the court and the
FCC were unconvinced by the D.N.C.'s argument that the R.N.C.'s
"high-priced media blitz,"3 7 aided by timing and frequency of airtime,
had "overwhelmed other points of view' '38 before the American public.39
Despite its ruling against the D.N.C., the court took pains to em-
phasize "the continuing vitality of the fairness doctrine,"' and to contra-
dict dicta in the FCC's earlier opinion which suggested that it may be
futile to challenge broadcasters on fairness doctrine grounds.4 Although
the court stated that the fairness doctrine remains a vital aspect in the
balance of broadcasters' "fiduciary duties to the public"42 with their
30. Id. at 1478.
31. Id. "[T]he fairness doctrine is distinct from the statutory requirement ... that equal
time be allotted to all qualified candidates for public office." 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (West 1976).
32. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1477 (quoting Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 16).
33. Id.
34. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1477. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 17. The FCC will
move forward with an investigation only if it is apparent that, in light of all the circumstances,
the broadcaster has acted unreasonably or arbitrarily.
35. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1478.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1474 n.1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1478.
40. Id. at 1479.
41. In effect, the FCC stated that issues raised by national political parties during paid
broadcasts are very adequately served by news coverage: "We find it difficult to envision a case
in which a major political party would raise an issue of public importance ignored by the
electronic press." Id. (quoting Memorandum Opinion and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 373, 383
(1983)).
42. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1479.
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"rights of journalistic discretion,"43 the court may have been saluting a
sinking ship.
Since 1975," the fairness doctrine has been under attack from
broadcasters, as well as the FCC.45 As the D.C. Circuit Court seemed to
imply, if that "formidable. . .barrier" 46 were not erected by the FCC to
ward off all but the most egregious fairness doctrine violations,47 the
FCC and the courts could seriously jeopardize broadcasters' first amend-
ment48 rights by imposing a "chilling effect"49 on journalists in the elec-
tronic media. Furthermore, opponents of the fairness doctrine argue that
its major justification, the scarcity of telecommunications outlets,5" is an
outdated notion.51 The proliferation of UHF and cable television outlets
has greatly increased accessibility to the airwaves.52
Based on these arguments, broadcasters and the FCC are currently
lobbying for the repeal of the fairness doctrine, asserting that the elec-
tronic media must have first amendment rights equal to those enjoyed by
43. Id. at 1478-79.
44. 121 CONG. REC. 1351-53 (March 4, 1975) (statement of Congressman Robert Drinan).
45. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1475 (quoting American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC,
607 F.2d 438, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
46. See Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1476.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. Democratic, 717 F.2d at 1475.
49. As an example of this "chilling effect", one proponent of deregulation cites in In re
Complaint of Sherwyn H. Hecht, 40 F.C.C.2d 1150 (1973), which was filed against a television
station in Spokane, Washington:
The licensee there editorialized on a controversial local issue. There was a dis-
crepency in time of 3 to I in favor of the side that the licensee favored in its editorial.
The Commission . . .looked into the complaint and ruled in favor of the licensee.
So, the Commission says, this is another example where it weighed the licensee's
judgment and did not chill debate. But when you examine the facts, you find that the
investigation took 2 1/2 years; that the license was held up during this period; that it
cost $20,000 in legal fees, and the station only earned probably $50,000 during the
entire year; and that it took 480 man-hours of the station's time and was quite trau-
matic to the station. The next time some very controversial local issue arises, the
station may well, consciously or unconsciously, decide not to air such an issue-to do
a 'safe issue' like school vandalism or canoe safety instead.
Geller, Television and Legal Problems in the Decade of the Eighties, in LAW AND TELEVISION
OF THE '80's 12-13 (1983). But see Red Lion Brdcst'g Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969)
(Supreme Court enunciates bases of the fairness doctrine requiring: (1) that broadcast facilities
must operate in the public interest; and (2) that under the first amendment the public has a
right to free and open debate).
50. See Id. at 388.
51. See Diefenderfer, Proposed Federal Legislation and the Next Decade of Television, LAW
AND TELEVISION OF THE '80's 237 (1983).
52. This scarcity concept was premised on the grounds that, since there was only a limited
number of frequencies available to the public for radio and television signals, the Federal gov-
ernment had the responsibility to regulate those allowed to broadcast over those frequencies.
Id.
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the print media.-3 While the proposal is opposed by some lobbying
groups and members of Congress,5 4 it appears that the doctrine has been
rendered all but impotent by the FCC and the courts. The fairness doc-
trine may not have breathed its last, but it appears that the FCC and
Congress may deal it a fatal blow in the not too distant future.
Sheila Bayne
53. Daily Variety, Sept. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
54. Id.
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D. Contract
1. Broadcaster's Unjustified Refusal To Air Advertiser's Commercials
Equals Breach Of Contract
In a contract action, under what circumstances is a television broad-
caster justified in refusing to broadcast an advertiser's commercial?
Moreover, if the failure to broadcast is considered a breach of the con-
tract, how should the amount of damages suffered by the advertiser be
computed?
In Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation,' the Fifth
Circuit held that Cosmos Broadcasting unjustly refused to broadcast the
plaintiff's commercials. However, on the issue of damages the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court since it believed that the
damage award was not substantiated by the evidence.2
Sam's Style Shop was a Florida based clothing retailer. In 1977, it
decided to run an advertising campaign, comparing its prices to those of
other clothing retailers. Sam's advertising representative contacted the
sales representative of WDSU, Cosmos' New Orleans affiliate. An agree-
ment was reached for the sale of television time for Sam's to air its com-
parative price commercials. The contract called for twelve thirty-second
commercials, at a total cost of $2,400.1
Sam's then sent its prepared commercial to WDSU. After viewing
the commercial, however, the station's management refused to televise it.
They felt that it would be too difficult to verify Sam's price claims each
time the commercial was broadcast, and thus the commmercial might
tend to mislead the television audience. Sam's sued for breach of
contract.4
Cosmos alleged that even if the court found that the parties had
agreed that Cosmos would broadcast a particular commercial, the con-
tract contained a potestative condition, under which Cosmos could de-
cide not to be bound by the agreement.5 There is a distinction in
Louisiana law between a "purely" potestative condition and a "simple"
potestative condition. A "purely" potestative condition is dependent
solely upon the whim, will, or caprice of the obligor, whereas a simple
potestative condition suspends execution rather than formation of the ob-
1. 694 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 1007.
3. Id. at 1000.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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ligation and, in addition, requires the obligor to make a good faith effort
to carry out the obligation.6
Louisiana law does not favor the interpretation of a contract condi-
tion as being "purely" potestative.7 Consequently, the court reasoned
that the clause in the contract implicitly imposed upon the broadcaster
the duty of making a good faith judgment based upon industry custom as
to whether Sam's commercial was acceptable.' Thus Cosmos could, for
example, justify its rejection of Sam's commercial if the commercial was
of poor quality, or if the commercial violated Cosmos' licensing
obligation.
Therefore, Cosmos had the burden of proving that its rejection of
Sam's commercial was reasonable and in accordance with objective stan-
dards prevailing in the industry.9 It was then for the jury to decide if
Cosmos successfully met its burden of proof. At the trial court level, the
jury found that Cosmos did not meet its burden and awarded Sam's
$50,000 in damages. 10 The Fifth Circuit accepted the jury's decision
about the burden of proof, but held that the damage award was
excessive. "
The Fifth Circuit stated that its review of the jury award was a deci-
sion as to whether or not the damage award was a serious abuse of dis-
cretion. 2 Therefore, before setting aside the verdict as excessive, the
court had to be satisfied that the award was completely without support
in the record.
13
At trial, Sam's had presented a witness who had conducted a survey
for Sam's. He compared Sam's sales in markets where Sam's did adver-
tise with those in which it did not broadcast its commercials. The con-
clusion of the survey was that, if Sam's had advertised in New Orleans, it
could have increased its net profit by $57,000.14
Reasoning that the survey did not take into account many determin-
ing variables, the court refused to accept the survey as sufficient evidence
to support the verdict. 5 The court reasoned that, if a retailer could
6. Franks v. Louisiana Health Serv. and Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1064, 1068 (La. Ct. App.
1980).
7. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 184 F.2d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
8. Sam's Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1003.
9. Id. at 1005.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1007.
12. Menard v. Penrod Drilling Co., 538 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. Glazer v. Glazer, 278 F. Supp. 476, 481-82 (E.D. La. 1968).
14. Sam's Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1007.
15. Id.
1985]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
make a $57,000 profit after spending only $5,000 to produce and televise
an advertisement, television would be flooded with commercials of this
type. Furthermore, if Sam's could make this type of profit, the court
could not understand why Sam's did not advertise in all of its market
areas. Consequently, the court decided that the trial court abused its
discretion in not granting a remittitur on the damage issue. 6
The court concluded its opinion by stating that, since Sam's did
prove some damage, namely, the $2,500 that it spent to prepare its com-
mercial, it was possible to arrive at a more reasonable amount as to the
damages award. A figure of $17,500 was reached by awarding Sam's the
cost of the commercial and then multiplying this figure by six, which
would represent the amount of the lost profits. 17 The court believed that
an award of $17,500 would not offend its sense of proportion.
The court was correct in deciding that Cosmos could not capri-
ciously refuse to televise Sam's advertisement once a contract had been
formed. If Cosmos did have such power to reject a commercial that it
had previously contracted to air, the whole contract agreement would be
one-sided and meaningless."8 However, Cosmos offered a substantial
reason for refusing to televise Sam's advertisement: Cosmos was afraid
that if it did televise a potentially deceptive commercial, the public might
be misled, and that, therefore, Cosmos could possibly be held liable in
some way for televising such deception. Cosmos stated that it would be
extremely difficult for it to verify the accuracy of the commercial each
time it would be broadcast since there would be a possibility that the
competitor's price quoted in Sam's commercial would be modified once
the competitor had seen that Sam's was advertising that Sam's price was
lower. 19
It is unclear from the court's opinion whether there is any validity to
this claim. If Cosmos' fear was unjustified, the court should have said so
and then discussed why the reason lacked merit. Instead, the court
evaded the issue and proceeded to the question as to whether or not the
commercial lived up to the industry's standards. The court then con-
cluded that Cosmos failed to meet its burden of persuading the court that
its rejection of Sam's advertisment was justified.
Unfortunately, the court failed to give Cosmos, or any other broad-
caster, any hint as to how it should conduct itself with respect to compar-
ative pricing commercials. Without such guidance, broadcasters might
16. Id. at 1008.
17. Id.
18. McTee & Co. v. Brown Funeral Home, 183 So. 558 (La. Ct. App. 1938).
19. Sam's Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1000.
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reasonably avoid this type of commercial, and, thereby limit the amount
of information available to consumers. Another alternative might be for
broadcasters to agree to televise such commercials only once, for only
then can it be certain that the named competitor has not changed his
price in response to the initial broadcasting of the commercial.
Comparative price commercials are being broadcast. KNBC, the
NBC affiliate in Los Angeles, televises C & R Clothier's advertisements
in which the clothing retailer compares the price it charges for a suit with
the price that named competitors charge for the identical suit. Along
with the commercial that it wishes to broadcast, C & R must also send to
KNBC a receipt from the named competitor indicating the price the
competitor charged for the suit and the date that the suit was
purchased.2 ° KNBC then keeps this receipt on file as support for the
data that C & R presents in its commercial.2" If the named competitor
wishes to challenge the accuracy of the C & R commercial, it submits its
documented claim to KNBC, which then forwards this information on to
C & R. It then becomes C & R's responsibility to refute the competitor's
allegations, or amend its commercial.22 As of November 1984, none of
the C & R commercials had been challenged;23 thus, it is difficult to con-
clude with certainty whether KNBC's procedures are effective. As
KNBC admitted, the FTC has offered no guidelines on comparative
price commercials. The broadcasters, therefore, have had to devise their
own procedures.2 4 It thus becomes even more apparent that it would
have been very helpful for the Sam's Style Shop court to have offered
some guidance.
The court's handling of damages is also questionable. The court
stated that Sam's would not be required definitively to prove the amount
of the alleged damages, but would only have to offer enough evidence to
allow the jury to find with reasonable certainty that the damages claimed
could reasonably have occurred.25 Sam's did go to the expense of con-
ducting a survey to substantiate the difference in net profits between
those areas in which it did advertise with those in which it did not. How-
ever, the court refused to accept that this survey had any validity since
the survey did not take into account the different times of the year com-
pared and the general economic situation of the years used in computing
20. Telephone interview with William Emerson, Manager, Broadcast Standards and Prac-
tices, KNBC, Burbank, California (Nov. 20, 1984).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sam's Style Shop, 694 F.2d at 1007.
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the results of the survey.2 6
The court's criticism of the survey may be valid, but one has to won-
der how comprehensive the survey would have had to have been to per-
suade the court. The more detailed and pervasive the survey, the more it
would cost to be conducted, computed, and analyzed. Thus, by this
court's decision, small to moderate retailers have, perhaps, been backed
into an economic corner of financing high cost litigation, or forced to
accept whatever the court considers appropriate damages, no matter how
effective and accurate comparative pricing advertising campaigns might
be.
William F Penzin
26. Id. at 1005.
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1. California Talent Agencies Act Applied To Television Commercial
Production Company
Like the mythical Cheshire cat, Hollywood's personal managers
have often seen their contracts disappear, for California has an inherent
invalidation procedure for many contracts executed by entertainment
artists. This procedure is accomplished under the regulation of the Tal-
ent Agencies Act,1 which prohibits any person or corporation from en-
gaging in the occupation of a talent agency without first procuring a
license from the State Labor Commissioner.2
In Cummins v. Film Consortium,3 the California Labor Commis-
sioner invalidated an artist's contracts under circumstances beyond the
usual artist-manager relationship. The contracts were entered into by
television commercial director Brian Cummins, and the television com-
mercial production company, The Film Consortium. This was the first
time the Labor Commissioner considered the role of television commer-
cial production companies in the context of the Act.4
An advertising agency generally desires specific directors for its cli-
ent's television commercials because a commerical is the artistic product
of the director.' Consequently, an advertising agency's primary concern
in accepting bids from commercial production companies is to obtain the
services of a specific director under contract to that company. The ad-
vertising agency then finances the production company, which in turn
pays the production costs and the director of the particular commercial.6
The process that brings a director and an advertising agency to-
gether often begins with the sales efforts of companies like Film Consor-
tium. Film Consortium's business activities consisted of signing
directors to long-term contracts and promoting their artistic services to
advertising agencies. Cummins and Film Consortium executed two em-
1. An Act to Amend. . . the Labor Code, relating to Talent Agencies, 1978 Cal. Stat.,
ch. 1382, § 3 (amending Artists' Managers Act, 1959, Cal. Stat., ch. 888, § 1, codified at CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985)).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 1984).
3. No. TAC 5-83 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Oct. 4, 1983).
4. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
5. In order to produce a commercial, the director determines the costs, organizes the
shooting schedule, hires the production crew, controls their actions and all the action that
occurs before the camera. Id., slip op. at 8.
6. Id., slip op. at 10.
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ployment contracts under such an arrangement.7
On April 4, 1983, Cummins petitioned the Labor Commissioner, al-
leging that Film Consortium had procured employment for him, and
thus acted as a talent agency as defined by the Talent Agencies Act.
Cummins asked that his contracts be declared unenforceable because
Film Consortium was not licensed to act as a talent agency.' He further
claimed that, in acting as a talent agency, Film Consortium had breached
its fiduciary responsibilities.9
Section 1700.4 of the Labor Code defines a talent agency as"... a
person or corporation who engages in the occupation of procuring, offer-
ing, promising, or attempting to procure employment . . . for an artist
or artists . . . ."1 The Labor Commissioner found that this language
and the purpose of the Act required its application to single acts of pro-
curing employment regardless of the procuring entity's overall activi-
ties.11 Therefore, Film Consortium's acts of procuring employment for
artists brought it under the regulations of the Act regardless of its claim
to be a production company. As a result, its contracts with Cummins
were unenforceable. 12
To support this strict application of the Talent Agencies Act, the
Commissioner cited Buchwald v. Superior Court."a In Buchwald, the Jef-
ferson Airplane rock group's manager was held to be subject to the Art-
ists' Managers Act 4 whether he was licensed or unlicensed as an artist's
manager."5 The Labor Commissioner, in Cummins, interpreted the ab-
7. Id., slip op. at 2.
8. Id. Section 1700.44 of the Labor Code establishes the procedures for the resolution of
controversies arising under the Act. It subjects all applicable cases to the jurisdiction of the
California Labor Commissioner. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44 (West Supp. 1985). The Cum-
mins case was heard by Carl G. Joseph, attorney for the Division of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment, serving as hearing officer under provisions of this section. Cummins, slip op. at 1.
9. Id., slip op. at 3-4. This was not a unique action in talent agency law. The Talent
Agencies Act, and its forerunner, the Artists' Managers Act, (see supra note 1) have been the
foundation on which entertainers, unhappy with their managers, commonly have declared
their contracts to be void. "Such artists traditionally have asserted that the personal manager
with whom they had contracted was not licensed as an 'artists' managers' and had committed
Iprocurement activity,' thus violating the Artists' Managers Act." Johnson & Lang, The Per-
sonal Manager in the California Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 386 (1979).
10. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1985).
11. Cummins, slip op. at 7-8.
12. Id. slip op. at 2.
13. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
14. The Artists' Managers Act was the statutory predecessor to the Talent Agencies Act.
The Artists' Managers Act was fundamentally identical to the Talent Agencies Act but for the
substitution of "a talent agency" for "an artists' manager" wherever it appeared. See supra
note 1.
15. 254 Cal. App. 2d at 355, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
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sence of a court's determination as to the Airplane's manager's primary
activities as authority for applying the Talent Agencies Act ". . . to any
person engaged in acts of the type regulated by the statute, regardless of
such person's 'primary activity.' "16
Persuasive authority was also found in an amicus brief filed by the
Labor Commissioner in Raden v. Laurie.7 In the Raden brief, the Com-
missioner contended that employment agency regulations should be in-
terpreted to include any and all activities whereby one procures
employment for another for a fee. 18 The Raden court, however, found
the plaintiff-manager of Piper Laurie19 had a valid claim for management
services although he was not licensed to procure employment for Lau-
rie.2" Absent evidence that the management contract was a mere subter-
fuge, the court was required to give effect to its provisions
notwithstanding the employment agency regulations.2"
The circumstances in Cummins, however, led the Labor Commis-
sioner to conclude that Film Consortium was engaged in procuring em-
ployment for directors.22 The Consortium opposed this conclusion by
maintaining that there was no correlation between the fees paid to it and
the director's salary it paid to Cummins. The Commissioner found that
this argument only proved that Film Consortium was able to earn a com-
mission directly from Cummins' earnings in addition to its markup on its
bids.23
Film Consortium also sought to differentiate itself from standard
talent agencies on the grounds that it was primarily a production com-
pany. These production activities were irrelevant because the threshold
test remained whether it had engaged in the type of activity regulated by
the Act.2 4 The protections of the Act could otherwise be frustrated and
an entity could evade the Act merely by engaging in activities other than
procuring employment. The possibility that an artist could be exploited
by a single contract or single instance of procuring employment necessi-
16. Cummins, slip op. at 6.
17. 120 Cal. App. 2d 778, 262 P.2d 61 (1953).
18. Cummins, slip op. at 7 (quoting the Labor Comm'r in the amicus brief filed in Raden).
19. Piper Laurie was a leading actress during the 1950's and today is still active in en-
tertainment. Among her memorable films is "Dangerous Mission" (1954), in which she was
chased by Vincent Price because she had witnessed a gangland murder.
20. Raden, 120 Cal. App. 2d at 783, 262 P.2d at 65. If the contract misrepresented the
true agreement of the parties to evade the law, then it would be the act of seeking employment
and not the contract which brought the legislation into play. Id. at 782, 262 P.2d at 65.
21. Id. at 783, 262 P.2d at 65.
22. Cummins, slip op. at 11.
23. Id., slip op. at 12.
24. Id.
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tated application of the Act in such situations.25
Film Consortium argued further that is relationship with Cummins
reflected the industry norm. The Commissioner also rejected this argu-
ment, stating "[tihat other such companies may also procure employ-
ment for directors . . . does not reduce the need for or effect of
application of the Act to [Film Consortium's] procurement activity on
behalf of Mr. Cummins. '26 Film Consortium further contended that the
Act was inapplicable because it had suffered losses on commercials di-
rected by Cummins. Provided losses could be proved, this too failed to
negate the fact that Film Consortium had engaged in activities regulated
by the Act.
In a final gasp, Film Consortium claimed that it was not enaged in
the occupation of procuring employment for artists. It relied on the New
York case of Pawlowski v. Woodruff27 for the proposition that procure-
ment activity incidental to a management contract was insufficient for
the application of the Talent Agencies Act. The Commission distin-
guished Pawlowski because it had construed a New York statute that
contained an exemption from licensing requirements where the business
of managing artists only incidentally involved the seeking of
employment.28
The Commissioner also found that Film Consortium had violated its
fiduciary duties as a talent agency. Its practice of circulating directors'
videotapes and film reels without identifying the work of the individual
directors obscured the identity of Cummins to his detriment.29
Application of the Talent Agencies Act according to the strict stan-
dard of Cummins raises the risks for those who contract with artists.
Interestingly, the facts of the case showed that Film Consortium had
engaged in multiple transations covered by the Act.3° The Cummins de-
termination, however, increases the risks for those who contract with art-
ists even further. By applying the Act to a single procurement act, nearly
every contract executed by an artist faces possible challenge.
The wide variety of tasks in which a manager may engage would
make it rather easy to find at least one instance that could be construed
25. Id., slip op. at 7.
26. Id., slip op. at 12.
27. 122 Misc. 695, 203 N.Y. Supp. 819 (App. Term. 1924).
28. Cummins, slip op. at 13. New York's regulation of talent agencies is encompassed
within that state's employment agencies laws. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. §§ 170-90 (McKinney
1979). The Pawlowski court interpreted a statute then in force and upheld a manager's award
for services rendered to a musician.
29. Cummins, slip op. at 15.
30. Id., slip op. at 5.
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as procuring employment. To restrict managers so that there would be
no violations of the Cummins standards would leave artists and manag-
ers alike with ineffective representation. Another alternative would be
for all managers to comply with the talent agency licensing requirements.
Notably, the Commissioner implied that some incidental procurement
activity might be excused. 31 However, beyond this general language, the
result and rationale of Cummins points to an almost strict liability stan-
dard for the applicability of the Talent Agencies Act.
A further consideration for the behavior of personal managers is the
effect that changes in the Act will have on future petitions. The defini-
tion of a talent agency has recently been amended and now contains an
exemption for contracts made with musicians. Until January 1, 1986,
the activities of procuring recording contracts for an artist will not, of
itself, subject a person to regulation and licensing under the Act.32
The reasons for the creation of this window period exemption are
twofold. Prior to the exemption, the Labor Commissioner had applied
the Act to musicians' contracts in circumstances where it was not clear
that it should have been applied.3 3 The purpose of the exemption was to
state clearly the intent that the Act should not apply to musicians, at
least during the window period.34 The legislation that created the musi-
cians' contracts exemption also formed an Entertainment Commission to
study the problems in the talent agency area. The Entertainment Com-
mission's report is due January 1, 1986, and will recommend legislation if
the studios show a need for new regulations.35 For the present, there will
continue to be several more years of unsettled contractual relationships
between artists and their managers.
Stephen F. Kilduff
31. Id., slip op. at 13. The Commissioner also implied that a significant financial gain by
the person being subjected to the regulations of the Act might be an important factor in deter-
mining the Act's applicability. Id., slip op. at 14.
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Supp. 1985). The exemption was originally to re-
main in effect until Jan. 1, 1985. Presumably, the area of talent agency law required further
study. The exemption was extended during the 1984 session of the California Legislature. An
Act to Amend. . . the Labor Code, relating to Talent Agencies, 1982 Cal. Stats., ch. 682, sec.
1, § 1700.4(b) (amended 1984 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 553 (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1700.4(b) (West Supp. 1985)).
33. Verbal legislative counsel report. Telephone interview with Kari Burks, assistant to
Assemblyman Richard Robinson, author of the statutory amendments in the Talent Agencies
Act (Oct. 3, 1984).
34. Id.
35. An Act to Amend. . . the Labor Code, relating to Talent Agencies, 1982 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 682, § 6 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1701-1704 (West Supp. 1985)).
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